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This research report by Alliance Anti-Trafic is a contribution to public understanding of the lives 
of Vietnamese sex workers in Ho Chi Minh City. 
 
Opinions expressed in the report are solely those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the 
views of Alliance Anti-Trafic, its partners and donors. Alliance Anti-Trafic uses the expression 
‘women involved in prostitution’ to refer to women who provide commercial sexual services. 
However, this report will use the term ‘sex worker’ to highlight the labor dimension involved in 
the sale of sex. This emphasis is critical to understand the collateralization of sexual labor in credit 
arrangements. 
 
Material from this publication may be reproduced for non-commercial purposes. No part of it may 
be reproduced in any form for commercial purposes without the prior express permission of the 
copyright holder. 
 
Citations of this publication should be made in the following manner: Lainez, Nicolas, Nguyễn Vũ 
Thúy Quỳnh, Lê Bùi Thảo Uyên, Blanchard, Georges. June 2020. ‘Easy to Borrow, Hard to 
Repay’: Credit and Debt in Ho Chi Minh City’s Sex Industry. Ho Chi Minh City: Alliance Anti-
Trafic. 
 
Unless otherwise specified, all photographs were taken by and remain the property of Nicolas 
Lainez. 
Cover photo: Nicolas Lainez 
Caption: An ad from an informal credit provider posted on a pole in front of a coffee shop. The 
message reads ‘lending (with interest). Collect money every day. Quick and simple formalities.’ 
 
© Alliance Anti-Trafic, June 2020. All rights reserved. 
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Alliance Anti-Trafic 
 
 
Alliance Anti-Trafic seeks to combat sexual exploitation, in particular sexual abuse and trafficking 
in women and minors in Southeast Asia. It develops pilot projects to help and protect women and 
minors through field actions implemented in a holistic and regional approach. It is based in Ho Chi 
Minh City and Bangkok. The Vietnamese branch launched its activities in 2001. 
 
Alliance Anti-Trafic designs, manages and implements projects based on action-oriented research. 
It believes that sexual exploitation, prostitution and trafficking in women and minors deserve 
extensive research from a wide and interdisciplinary perspective. Alliance Anti-Trafic’s research 
projects have several objectives: 1) to fill knowledge gaps, 2) to optimize current research tools, 
3) to test innovative methods for data collection, 4) to foster close cooperation between academics, 
action-oriented researchers and policy-makers, 5) to network with academic and development 
institutions as well as government agencies to promote complementary efforts and synergies.  
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Glossary 
 
 
bảo kê: pimp 
cho mượn tình cảm: to lend for affectionate reasons 
cho vay: to lend money with interest 
chủ quán: outlet manager 
chửi: to insult 
chứng minh thư: identity card 
dồn tiền: to increase the existing principal (for a tiền góp loan) 
đánh: beat (someone) up 
đi chơi (với khách): going out, having fun / sex (with clients)  
giang hồ: bandit, criminal, gangster, member of the underworld 
giáo dục viên đồng đẳng: peer educators  
ham tiền lời: greedy for interest / profit 
hộ khẩu: household registration certificate 
hợp đồng lao động: labor contract 
khách: client 
lãi suất: interest rate / lãi cắt cổ: cut-throat interest rate  
mượn: to borrow  
người bán dâm: sex worker 
người bảo lãnh: guarantor 
người cho vay lãi: moneylender / người cho vay nặng lãi: usurer 
người giới thiệu: introducer 
nợ: debt 
nợ chồng nợ: one debt overlaps another debt 
quê: hometown 
số đề: illegal lottery (lottery number) 
tài chính vi mô: microfinance 
tạm trú dài hạn: long-term temporary residency 
tạm ứng lương: wage advance 
tệ nạn xã hội: social evils 
thường trú: permanent residency 
tiền đứng: money that stands 
tiền gốc: principal  
tiền góp: collected money 
tiền phạt: fine 
tín dụng: credit 
tín dụng đen: black credit, predatory lending 
tín dụng vi mô: microcredit 
trả nhỏ: pay little by little 
trốn nợ: flee a debt 
tụi Hải Phòng: gang from Hải Phòng (coastal city in northern Vietnam) 
xã hội đen: gangster, mafia (literally ‘black society’) 
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Executive summary 
 
 
This study examines the inner workings of credit and debt in the sex industry in Ho Chi 
Minh City, the megalopolis of Southern Vietnam. It argues that credit is widely available to 
financially excluded sex workers, but that this availability comes with tight constraints. As one sex 
worker put it bluntly, ‘it is easy to borrow, but it is hard to repay.’ This tension summarizes the 
financial lives of indoor and outdoor sex workers who borrow money from the informal credit 
market to fund consumption and make ends meet. 
This study is timely for several reasons. First, it provides a valuable contribution to research 
on sex workers’ indebtedness, a topic that has yet to be addressed in Vietnam or elsewhere. It also 
sheds light on moneylending in urban Vietnam, an area that also remains understudied. Second, 
debt in the sex trade is shrouded by speculation about coercion, violence and bondage. The insights 
from this study do not challenge widespread assumptions about debt as an extractive and coercive 
device. However, instead of blaming ‘evil’ pimps and moneylenders for using debt as a tool of 
control, they locate moneylending in the social, economic and political context of post-reform 
Vietnam. Third, credit is a hot issue in present-day Vietnam, a country where per capita debt had 
surged tenfold from USD126 to USD1,296 and household debt 50-fold from USD1.76 to USD91 
billion between 2000 and 2016, marking an average annual growth rate of 28.6 percent. This rapid 
rise of household debt deserves further consideration from the perspective of urban precarious 
laborers including sex workers operating in the shadows of the market economy in Vietnam. 
 
Objectives 
The objectives of the study are: 
 
1. To examine why sex workers borrow money from the informal credit market, a question 
that casts light on the broader issue of financial exclusion among precarious workers. 
 
2. To describe the loans that pimps, managers of entertainment outlets and moneylenders 
offer to sex workers, with a focus on their prices, conditions, and enforcement methods. 
 
3. To explore sex workers’ challenges and strategies for repaying their loans as well as 
balancing their obligations and constraints. 
 
4. To reflect on the impact of microcredit interventions in relieving sex workers’ indebtedness 
and consumer lending in ensuring financial inclusion and social cohesion.  
 
Methodology and sample 
Data for this study come from semi-structured interviews with 20 sex workers, nine lenders 
including one manager of a coffee shop, seven ‘neighborhood moneylenders’ who lend money in 
their social networks, two ‘giang hồ gangs’ (criminal moneylenders) that provide credit to any 
borrowers, four peer educators from Alliance Anti-Trafic including one working part-time as a 
neighborhood moneylender, and two directors of non-government organizations. A limitation of 
the study is that peer educators recruited indebted sex workers only. Hence, the finding that all 
women are indebted does not indicate that all sex workers in HCMC’s sex industry are indebted.  
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Key findings 
Sex workers earn more than the average worker in urban Vietnam. However, their income 
does not suffice to cover consumption and contingencies. They balance the gap between income 
and expenses by borrowing money. Since they are excluded from mainstream financial services, 
they borrow money from the vibrant informal credit sector. They can easily access loans from 
pimps, managers of entertainment outlets and moneylenders that target their communities. These 
lenders require few or no guarantees to issue two types of loans of up to VND10 million (USD431). 
The first, tiền góp (collected money), involves the repayment of the principal and interest (25 
percent per month) daily over a 24-day period. The second, tiền đứng (money that stands), involves 
the payment of the interest rate (30 percent or more per month) every day until the principal is 
repaid. In this case, there is no specific period of repayment. These loans form the core of informal 
moneylending in Vietnam. 
The conditions of these loans vary according to the labor relationship (or lack of) between 
debtors and creditors. Pimps act as brokers who provide limited services to street sex workers, 
including client recruitment, protection and credit. They use sexual labor as collateral for a debt. 
Managers advance wages to waitresses and hostesses and deduct them from their paycheck. In this 
credit system, which prevails in other non-sexual labor sectors, wages serve as collateral for debt. 
Neighborhood moneylenders lend money to their social networks, mainly to people they are 
familiar with and trust. They cultivate a reputation for gentleness and combine flexibility and 
verbal violence to enforce repayment. Giang hồ gangs issue loans to borrowers with whom they 
need no previous relationships. They do not establish labor ties with their clients. They cultivate a 
reputation of aggressiveness and use strong-arm recovery methods. All-together, these three types 
of lenders are the primary source of credit for sex workers.  
Vietnamese policymakers vilify the ‘archaic’ moneylending sector and the ‘rapacious’ 
moneylender that preys on poor and honest workers. Even if moral judgments on usury and usurers 
are socially constructed and therefore disputable, the fact is that standard market rates for tiền 
góp and tiền đứng loans are too high for sex workers. These women make ends meet by juggling 
with loans, lenders and deadlines, especially by borrowing from one lender to pay another one. 
They also live day-by-day in a temporality structured around debt schedules, rhythms, and 
deadlines. Repeated and chronic borrowing pushes sex workers into a spiral of debt, a source of 
concern and anxiety. Instead of rebelling against their lenders, they commit to labor and rest their 
hope in finding a generous client or patron who will ease their debts. In last resort, they run away 
temporarily from their lender to signal their inability to pay installments, or permanently to start 
anew elsewhere. However, running away comes at a high social, professional and economic cost. 
Policy, development and financial stakeholders promote microfinance and consumer 
lending as a remedy to financial exclusion, credit scarcity and exploitative finance. Government 
agencies implement microcredit programs aimed at empowering disadvantaged women. Their 
impact on alleviating sex workers’ indebtedness is limited though, as their main goal is to help 
women quit sex work. As for the rapidly growing consumer credit sector, it is unclear if it can 
fulfill its promises of financial inclusion, equality and prosperity for all. 
In essence, a key finding from this study is that sex workers are heavily indebted. This 
insight results from a bias in the recruiting process. However, it also reflects a general trend 
towards fast-rising household debt in Vietnam. Another important finding is that debt can be 
harmful to borrowers. Research in economic anthropology shows that while some debts may 
produce solidarity and social cohesion, others lead to exploitation and domination. This study leans 
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towards the negative assessment of debt, as many sex workers struggle to repay tiền góp and tiền 
đứng loans. A third main finding is that envisioning practical solutions to help indebted sex 
workers is a challenge for government agencies and NGOs, given the structural underpinnings of 
household debt. Tackling structural issues, such as social, administrative and financial exclusion 
and growing inequalities, may be more productive than blaming ‘evil’ pimps and moneylenders 
for oppressing the vulnerable poor.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
“I feel that I work very hard every day just to pay the interest. But that’s the rule: If I borrow 
money, I must pay the interest. I am very sad and anxious about this. Even if I want to pay my 
lenders off, I don’t have enough money. It is easy to borrow, but it is hard to repay. I wish I could 
make enough money every day to pay them off. That way, they would not harass me anymore.” 
This quote expresses Nguyệt’s concerns about repaying her debts to several lenders she owed 
money to. Nguyệt, 39, had been working as a call girl and street sex worker in Ho Chi Minh City 
(HCMC) for more than 20 years. She was the sole breadwinner of a household of three children 
and a disabled and unemployed husband who disapproved of her job as a sex worker. She 
constantly needed credit to cover consumption needs, cash flows and outstanding debts. Unable to 
meet the banks’ requirements, she relied on informal or non-regulated credit sources. When my 
assistant and I met her in the spring of 2019, she owed VND2, 5 and 3 million (USD86, 216 and 
129) to two gangs of moneylenders and a moneylender from her neighborhood, respectively. She 
was struggling to repay both the principal and daily interests. 
As the interviews with indebted sex workers went on, the idea that ‘it is easy to borrow, 
but it is hard to repay’ (khi mượn thì dễ, khi trả mới khó) became a commonplace, as most women 
had experienced or were experiencing difficulties in repaying their loans. How could they borrow 
money quickly and easily from pimps, managers of entertainment outlets and moneylenders – their 
primary credit providers – and struggle so much to repay? Why could they not borrow money from 
the banks when consumer lending is booming in Vietnam? What guaranties did informal lenders 
demand? Why did sex workers keep taking loans if they were aware of the risks of ‘getting deeper 
into a hole,’ to use their metaphor? Are microcredit programs and consumer lending appropriate 
solutions to overcome the indebtedness of precarious (sex) workers, as argued by policymakers 
and development and financial advocates? These are some questions this report will examine using 
qualitative interviews with sex workers, lenders and peer educators conducted in the megalopolis 
of HCMC in Southern Vietnam. 
This study fills essential gaps in research on sex work and moneylending in Vietnam and 
beyond. Some studies examine the economic lives of sex workers and the economics of the sex 
industry (Marcus et al. 2016; Cunningham and Shah 2016). Yet, none has addressed credit and 
debt in the lives of sex workers, except in relation to undocumented migration for sex work (see 
the literature review in Lainez 2020) and the nexus of student loan and sex work in the UK Roberts 
et al, 2010). And while a few works have evaluated the impact of microfinance interventions in 
the lives of sex workers (Tsai et al. 2011; 2018), they have not delved into financial exclusion, the 
recourse to informal credit and the nexus of debt, sex and labor. The second body of literature this 
study contributes to is existing studies on informal finance in Vietnam. Scholars have examined 
the transformation of informal credit markets since the launch of the Renovation reforms in 1986 
aimed at putting Vietnam on the path of market socialism (Pham and Lensink 2007; Duong and 
Izumida 2002; Ruddle 2011). This report contributes to these works by providing a fine-grained 
examination of moneylending in HCMC, with a focus on two loans that borrowers take massively 
for consumer expenditure: tiền góp (money collected) and tiền đứng (money that stands). 
Overall, this report aims to establish an empirical knowledge base to inform policy and 
stimulate further research on the financial lives of precarious (sex) workers, and moneylending in 
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a context of rising household debt (Nguyen et al. 2018). It does so by describing debt practices and 
by giving voice to informants through quotes and expressions that reflect their views on economic, 
familial and professional matters.  
 
The initial objectives of the study are: 
 
1. To examine why sex workers borrow money from the informal credit market, a question 
that sheds light to the broader issue of financial exclusion in Vietnam, 
 
2. To describe the range, price and conditions of credit products that pimps, managers and 
moneylenders offer to sex workers, 
 
3. To explore sex workers’ challenges and strategies for repaying their loans as well as 
balancing their obligations and constraints, 
 
4. To reflect on the effectiveness of microcredit interventions and consumer lending in 
alleviating indebtedness among sex workers.  
 
The report is divided into four chapters and a conclusion.  
Chapter 2 presents the methodology, the sample, the study’s limitations and the informants’ 
background. 
Chapter 3 addresses sex workers’ reasons for borrowing money, the nexus of financial 
exclusion and informal finance, and the loans that pimps, managers of entertainment outlets and 
moneylenders offer to sex workers. 
Chapter 4 examines the controversies around the morality of usury and high-interest rates, 
and sex workers’ practices of juggling with debts, lenders and deadlines, living day-by-day, 
holding on tight to labor and hope, and running away from their lenders. 
Chapter 5 evaluates microcredit interventions and financial inclusion as antidotes to 
financial exclusion and exploitative informal finance. 
The conclusion summarizes the main findings, reflects on the specificity of credit and debt 
in the sex trade, and presents the activities that Alliance Anti-Trafic (AAT) implements to support 
sex workers. 
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2. Methodology, sample, participants’ profiles 
 
 
• The sample comprises 35 informants, including 20 sex workers, 9 lenders, 4 peer educators, 
and 2 directors of NGO. 
  
• The average sex worker is 34 years-old, single and a separated mother with two children, 
earns VND7 million (USD302) per month for working outdoors and VND11.57 million 
(USD499) for working indoors. 
 
• Small-scale neighborhood moneylenders lend money in their social networks, in particular 
to neighbors, acquaintances, friends and clients from other trades. 
  
• Giang hồ or criminal moneylenders provide loans to all sorts of borrowers and employ 
violent recovery methods. 
 
------------------------- 
 
This section presents the methodology and the sample. It provides a detailed background 
of the respondents, in particular their age, places of origin, administrative and marital situation, 
educational level, professional experience and motivations. This data is put into perspective with 
data from a survey conducted by peer educators from AAT.  
 
2.1. Methodology, data and limitations 
Data for this study come from semi-structured interviews with sex workers (người bán 
dâm), managers of entertainment outlets (chủ quán), moneylenders (người cho vay lãi), and peer 
educators (giáo dục viên đồng đẳng) from AAT who also arranged interviews. These educators 
are former sex workers who provide information to fellow sex workers on how to reduce health- 
and labor risks. Interviews with sex workers covered their socio-economic profile, administrative 
status, experience in the sex trade, income and expenses, debt situation with a detailed account of 
their outstanding loans, reasons for borrowing, choice of lenders, risk calculation, debt recording, 
plans to repay debt and future aspirations. Interviews with moneylenders explored their pathway 
to moneylending, their lending operation, issues of reputation and market competition, recovery 
methods, perceptions on high-interest rates and violence, and police repression. Lastly, interviews 
with peer educators covered the issues described above and matters related to sexually transmitted 
diseases (STI) and HIV infection, drug and gambling addiction, domestic violence and work with 
non-government organizations (NGO). Occasionally, these topics served as an entrée to explore 
more intimate knowledge and experiences during second and third interviews with respondents. 
While the write-up of some case studies did not exceed five pages, others that combined data from 
various in-depth interviews with written materials such as debt contracts, records and ledgers went 
beyond 30 pages. 
All interviews were conducted and recorded in Vietnamese, transcribed into English and 
processed with NVIVO, a qualitative data analysis software. Before conducting interviews, my 
assistant and I took prior consent with respondents. The ethical consent process consisted of 
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explaining them the general purpose and objectives of the study, their rights to refuse to answer 
any question and to end the interview at any time, their rights to anonymity, and the presence and 
purpose of recording equipment and the option to opt-out of recording interview. All informants 
were provided with transportation costs, refreshments and a VND100,000 (USD4.3) token of 
appreciation. For confidentiality reasons, the names used in this report are all pseudonyms. 
 
The sample comprises 35 informants including: 
 
• 20 sex workers of which nine worked outdoor in public areas or as call girls and 11 worked 
indoors as waitresses and hostesses in coffee shops, restaurants, bars and karaoke lounges, 
 
• 9 lenders including one in charge of a five-people gang of moneylenders, one working 
with an association of moneylenders, one running a moneylending family business, six 
working individually in their neighborhood, one managing a coffee shop, and one working 
as a peer educator from AAT, 
 
• 4 peer educators from AAT including one who was also working as a neighborhood 
moneylender,  
 
• 2 directors of NGO including AAT and Mekong Plus.  
 
The sample is not representative of the large number of sex workers and lenders operating 
in the vast HCMC’s sex industry. Since the goal was to understand the inner workings of credit 
and debt in the sex trade, the peer educators from AAT recruited indebted sex workers and their 
lenders. This bias explains why all the sex workers from the study were indebted, which does not 
mean that all sex workers in HCMC’s sex industry are indebted. The peer educators could easily 
recruit street sex workers and neighborhood moneylenders. However, they struggled to enlist 
hostesses and waitresses who are usually not allowed to leave their premises during working hours, 
giang hồ gangs that operate discreetly, and pimps who are reluctant to be interviewed.  
The data also includes a survey conducted in several districts of HCMC by the peer 
educators in 2019, as part of a more extensive survey that AAT has carried since 2002. This multi-
year survey builds on the trust that peer educators have gained with sex workers from different 
sectors and communities through years of outreach work. The 2019 survey involves 1,741 sex 
workers working in public areas, coffee shops, beer gardens, and guest houses. It covers their age, 
place of origin, occupation before sex work, location of previous jobs, reasons for choosing sex 
work, time spent in the sex trade, number of clients the day before the survey, risk practices, and 
condom and drug use. It provides a general background of HCMC’s sex industry. It should be said 
that this data has a margin of error because some women hide sensitive information. 
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Figure 1: A group discussion with the outreach group ‘Riding the waves’ (Nhóm vượt sóng) 
(photo taken by a peer educator from the group). 
 
2.2. Sex workers: varied backgrounds and trajectories 
The survey data shows that 1,511 out of 1,741 surveyed sex workers were older than 25 
(the survey didn’t break age above 25). The average age of the sex workers from the study was 
34.4, and the range was between 20 and 55. Eight women were between 20 and 29, five between 
30 and 39, five between 40 and 49, and two above 50 (see annex for details). This study reveals 
an age gap between street sex workers whose average age was 43.6 (n=9) and indoor sex workers 
aged 27.3 (n=11). In general, aging sex workers cannot secure work in entertainment venues where 
clients seek young and new hostesses and waitresses. As a result, they work in public areas with 
or without pimps, or as independent call girls.  
As for places of origin, data from the AAT survey shows the majority of sex workers in 
HCMC were internal migrants: 1,192 women came from provinces in the Mekong delta and 
bordering HCMC, 285 were from HCMC, 261 from Central Vietnam, and 3 from China. This data 
is inconsistent with the findings from this study, which show that half of the sex workers (11) were 
from HCMC and the other half (9) from Southern Vietnam, including the provinces of Tiền Giang 
(4), Long An (1), Đồng Nai (1), Vĩnh Long (1), Bến Tre (1), and An Giang (1) (see annex).  
Regarding administrative issues, the sex workers from HCMC had their ID (chứng minh 
nhân dân) and/or household registration certificate (hộ khẩu) in HCMC. Similarly, those from 
other provinces had their papers (giấy tờ) registered in their hometown. One sex worker never had 
papers because her mother could not declare her when she was born. Another was using a fake ID 
to book hotel rooms. Another had lost her papers but was reluctant to return to her hometown to 
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renew them to avoid a lengthy and expensive process. More worrisome was the fact that internal 
migrants could not regularize their residential situation. They faced administrative barriers to 
secure long-term temporary residency (tạm trú dài hạn) and permanent residency (thường trú) in 
HCMC. Policymakers worry that relaxing the household registration system may increase 
migration to urban centers, straining public services and municipal finances. As a result, there are 
about 5.6 million people with temporary registration status or no registration at all in their place 
of residence, including 36 percent of the population of HCMC and 18 percent in Hanoi (World 
Bank, VASS 2016, ix). Without a regularized household certificate and ID, internal migrants face 
limitations in accessing public services such as school, health and subsidized credit. To access 
such services, they often rely on ‘favors’ from district and ward officers and pay a premium price 
in addition to bribes, which strains their finances. The lack of regularized papers is also a barrier 
to access consumer loans from the private sector. This administrative imbroglio perpetuates their 
marginalization, financial exclusion and reliance on informal credit. 
As for the marital status of sex workers, almost two-thirds (12) were separated or divorced, 
four were married, three were single and one had a boyfriend. For the separated or divorced ones, 
six never married legally but spent several years with a partner they referred to as their ‘husband’ 
(chồng) (see annex). Five women from the sample had experienced emotional and physical abuse 
from their husbands, especially when they were drunk or discovered that their wives were secretly 
working as a sex worker. These women had, on average, 1.8 children. More precisely, four had 
three children, half (10) had two children, four had one child and two had no children (see annex). 
Two sex workers had children from different men. After breaking up, separating or divorcing, 
partners and husbands provided no child support, which placed a considerable burden on single 
mothers. Under these circumstances, three sex workers sent their children to their hometowns to 
be taken care of by their families and supported their education with remittances. Xuyến, a 26-
year-old bargirl, explained that “I have two children, but had no husbands, only boyfriends, and 
they all left. My mother takes care of my two children. One of my children is eight years old and 
the other is around eight or nine months old. They have two separate fathers. For the first father, 
when I gave birth, he kept abusing me. For the second one, he didn’t like my first child and he left, 
giving no support to his child.” Several women expressed frustration and anger at men, a pattern 
documented in research on Vietnamese sex workers in Southeast Asia (Lainez 2015), Vietnamese 
second wives in Laos (Lainez and Nguyen 2020) and Vietnamese brides in commercially arranged 
marriages (Bélanger, Hong, and Linh 2013). 
The data on educational attainment is inconsistent, as only ten women elaborated on this 
topic. Among them, one never went to school, one started elementary school and quit in 2nd grade, 
eight went to middle school (6th to 9th grades), one completed 10th grade from high school, and 
none went to higher education institutions (see annex). Regarding personal and professional 
backgrounds, the survey data shows that before joining the sex trade, over a third (628) of the sex 
workers were unemployed, 536 were manual workers, 310 were small business owners, 83 were 
housewives and 78 worked in the agricultural sector. Moreover, more than half (1,130) worked in 
HCMC and the rest in their hometown. This diversity of personal and professional trajectories is 
consistent with insights from this study. Before becoming a sex worker, eight women had different 
occupations as employee in a nail shop, a housekeeper, a food peddler and housewife, a street 
seller and a tailor, a housewife, an assistant in a tattoo shop, a drink seller, and a worker in a shoe 
company. The remaining 12 had worked for more than two years in the sex trade, often shifting 
between entertainments outlets and indoor and outdoor sectors of the sex industry (see annex). 
Altogether, diverse educational backgrounds and life trajectories led women to sex work at 
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different stages of their lives. They combined sexual and non-sexual labor but also sex-for-cash 
arrangements, mistress-type relationships and marriage based on constraints and opportunities (see 
Lainez 2015; Lainez and Nguyen 2020 for a discussion on sexual careers). 
On economic matters, the AAT survey points that more than half (1,004) of the surveyed 
women chose the sex trade for economic reasons. A fourth (468) did it to find a man who would 
marry and support them, whilst a tenth (187) chose it to help their relatives. This study also sheds 
light on income levels. In particular, it shows that earnings varied greatly for outdoor and indoor 
sex work. On average, street sex workers made VND7 million (USD302) per month, waitresses in 
coffee shops, bars and restaurants earned VND10 million (USD431), and karaoke hostesses gained 
VND17.7 million (USD763). The average monthly income for outdoor and indoor sex workers 
was VND10.1 million (USD435.3) and their average expenses was VND10.9 million (USD470) 
(see annex). These income levels far exceeded those of workers in non-sexual labor sectors who 
earned VND4.5 million (USD194) and VND2.4 million (USD103) in urban and rural areas 
respectively in 2016 (General Statistics Office 2019, 16). In short, a street sex worker earned 50 
percent more than an average urban worker. Incomes soared for indoor sex workers who could 
add commissions on food and alcohol, tips and fees for sexual services to their salary. Both outdoor 
and indoor sex workers included income and working conditions in their assessments of labor 
arrangements. Street sex workers working the night shift earned less than waitresses and karaoke 
hostesses, but invested their spare time in other jobs during the day. However, earnings were 
unstable for street sex workers during the rainy season and festive periods such as the Vietnamese 
New Year (Tết) because of intense police raids. 
 
2.3. Lenders: neighborhood and giang hồ moneylenders  
There are two types of moneylenders. The first group comprises small-scale ‘neighborhood 
moneylenders.’ I coined this term to refer to eight female lenders from the sample who worked 
individually and provided loans to neighbors, acquaintances, friends and clients from other trades. 
Their average age was 45.2, with an age range between 34 and 65. Six women were from HCMC 
and two were from Long An and Lâm Đồng provinces. Five were married and had children, one 
was a widow, one was a single mother and one did not disclose her marital status. These women 
formed a coherent group of moneylenders. A first striking resemblance was that six had worked 
as sex workers for varying periods during which they saved from VND5 to 200 million (USD216-
8,629). The six used their savings to launch a small moneylending venture. Another woman started 
working as a bartender and became a peer educator and subsequently a part-time moneylender. 
The last one worked as a bus ticket seller before opening a coffee shop, a trade that she used to 
lend money to her employees. A second startling similarity was that these 8 female lenders used 
their extensive experience and connections in the sex trade to lend money to sex workers first. 
Once they gained experience and contacts, built their reputation and increased their capital, they 
expanded their operation to circles of neighbors and acquaintances. A third similarity was that they 
‘lend money for affectionate reasons’ (cho mượn tình cảm), as they often stressed, meaning at 
slightly lower rates and with more flexibility toward defaulters than moneylending gangs. 
The second group comprises moneylending gangs, which sex workers commonly refer to 
as giang hồ (namely ‘bandit’ or ‘outlaw,’ I will use this term to refer to moneylending gangs), tụi 
Hải Phòng (gang from Hải Phòng, a coastal city from Northern Vietnam popularly considered as 
a hotbed for criminality) and xã hội đen (gangster, mafia, the term means ‘black society’). Unlike 
neighborhood moneylenders, giang hồ gangs provided loans to any borrowers. Northern gangs 
have expanded their moneylending activities across Vietnam over the past years, especially in 
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HCMC. They speak with a distinctive northern Vietnamese accent and cultivate a reputation of 
being reckless, belligerent and cold-hearted. The most notorious and conspicuous such as Hiệp 
Đen in HCMC and Quang Rambo in Hanoi (he was arrested in August 2019) display tattoos, fancy 
vehicles, flashy jewelry and stacks of cash in social media. Some of these gangs use pawnshops 
and rental and wholesale businesses as fronts for their moneylending operations. The government 
and the media refer to their moneylending businesses as ‘black credit’ (tín dụng đen), a term 
popularly associated with unlicensed lending, exorbitant rates and strong-arm recovery methods. 
Recently, sensationalizing and extensive media coverage about black credit operations has stirred 
up public indignation and a strong call for political action (VietnamNet 2018, see section 5).  
The two giang hồ moneylenders from the study were males and belonged to small gangs 
of five and seven members respectively. The first, Quách, 37, was from HCMC and lived with his 
wife and two children. He had worked as a moneylender and debt collector his entire life. He 
worked independently but in close contact with seven moneylenders who formed an association 
or collective This group controlled specific areas, shared information about borrowers and 
defaulters, lent money to each other at no cost and followed a few rules such as the prohibition to 
share the same borrowers and the application of the same rates to all their clients to avoid 
competition. Quách did not disclose his working capital, but stated that “it is not very much 
actually, around a few tens of millions đồng. It’s a pretty small business.” 
The second giang hồ moneylender was Quyền, 40, originating from HCMC. He had spent 
several years in jail where he built a reputation of stubbornness and ruthlessness. He was the leader 
(người đứng đầu) of a gang of five ‘little brothers’ (em út / đàn em) involved in pawnshops and 
moneylending. He launched his lending operation with a capital of VND50 million (USD2,155), 
which rose to VND300 million (USD12,931) over two years. Quyền turned out to be a generous 
informant who agreed to a second interview and provided very detailed information on legal and 
repressive matters, conflicts between local and Hải Phòng gangs in HCMC, and the little-known 
worlds of pawnshops and debt collectors. 
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3. ‘Easy to borrow’: Widely available credit 
amid financial exclusion 
 
 
• Pimps, managers and moneylenders provide tiền góp and tiền đứng loans to sex workers. 
The former involves the repayment of the principal and interest every day, whereas the 
latter refers to the repayment of interests until the principal is repaid.  
  
• Pimps act as brokers who provide limited services to street sex workers including credit. 
Sexual labor serves as collateral in debt arrangements. 
 
• Managers apply the wage advance system with their staff and deduct advances from their 
paycheck. The wage serves as collateral.  
  
• Neighborhood moneylenders lend money in their social networks, cultivate a reputation 
for gentleness, show flexibility and use verbal violence to enforce repayment.  
 
• Giang hồ moneylenders lend money to any borrowers, cultivate a reputation for 
aggressiveness, instill fear in their clients and use extreme violence to recover bad debts. 
 
------------------------- 
 
This study argues that sex workers could easily borrow money from the informal finance 
market despite being excluded from mainstream financial services. Why is that? Credit (tín dụng) 
has become a hot issue in Vietnam, a country caught in an all-out race for consumer lending 
liberalization (see section 5.2). This credit boom is driven by favorable demographics and a steady 
increase in income and consumption among young, aspirational and middle-class groups in urban 
areas. However, large segments of the population remain unbanked – up to 70 percent (World 
Bank 2018, 160) – and therefore financially excluded. People have long complained about the 
stringent requirements for paperwork and the lengthy procedures that banks impose on loan 
applicants. The sex workers from this study were unbanked and only three had interacted with 
formal banking to purchase motorcycles and smartphones on installments. They lacked credit 
history to reassure formal lenders and assets, pay slips and a stable and legitimate occupation to 
use as collateral. These issues surfaced in my discussion with Tuyết, a 48-year-old street sex 
worker and call girl: “if I want to borrow money from the bank, I need to have a stable income. I 
need to provide my pay slip so they can consider my case. I don’t know about the credit that only 
requires ID or household registration certificate. When I go to the bank, they ask for a copy of my 
pay slip, but my job doesn’t have that.” In brief, administrative, economic and labor-related factors 
reinforce sex workers’ financial exclusion.  
In Vietnam, as in many other countries, financially excluded borrowers turn to the informal 
credit sector embedded in social relations, especially to friends, acquaintances, employers and 
moneylenders. The informal credit sector remains strong in Vietnam. Although its prevalence has 
decreased from 51 percent of all credit transactions in 1998 (Pham and Lensink 2007, 188) to 20 
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and 16 percent in 2004 and 2006 respectively (Nguyen and van den Berg 2014, 158), it remains 
solidly anchored in many sectors such as household borrowing (Duong and Izumida 2002), the 
fishing (Ruddle 2011) and garment sectors (Goto 2013), transnational labor migration (Hoang and 
Yeoh 2015), and unregulated migration for sex work (Lainez 2020). Borrowers are more likely to 
rely on informal sources if their income is low (Barslund and Tarp 2008, 501; Duong and Izumida 
2002, 333; Nguyen and van den Berg 2014, 158), if they cannot provide collateral or a guarantor, 
if they need credit for consumption, and if they are a female who is not acting as a household head 
(Pham and Lensink 2007, 200). Borrowers tend to first approach relatives who provide loans with 
no collateral, low or no interest rate and a flexible repayment schedule. Alternatively, they borrow 
from moneylenders who offer flexible yet costly loans.  
This pattern applies to sex workers who would first approach peers for small loans payable 
within a few days, and then pimps, managers and moneylenders for bigger loans, yet with more 
constraints. These commercial lenders not only viewed sex workers as credible and profitable 
because of their high earnings, but also as a high-risk group because they could contract STI/HIV, 
be arrested by the police and develop addiction to gambling and drugs like meta-amphetamine, 
which procurers provide to help them work long hours. For their part, sex workers praised lenders’ 
availability. Linh, a 30-year-old street sex worker, explained that “I know that bank credit has a 
lower interest rate. But if I need money for emergencies, managers and moneylenders can lend me 
right away, even if it is midnight, whereas banks cannot. It is more convenient to borrow from 
managers and moneylenders.” However, widely available credit comes at a high price. 
A key finding from this study is that pimps, managers and moneylenders provide two types 
of loans to sex worker, which prevail in the informal moneylending market in Vietnam (see Lainez 
2014). They are called tiền góp (money collected) and the second is tiền đứng (money that stands). 
For tiền góp, the borrower repays the principal (tiền gốc) and interest in installments (góp) every 
day during an agreed-upon period, generally 24 days. The standard interest rate is 20 percent for 
24 days or 25 percent per month. For a VND1 million (USD43) loan, a borrower has to pay 
VND50,000 (USD2.2) every day for 24 days. S/he can top-up or ‘increase the existing principal’ 
(dồn tiền) of the loan after 15 or 20 days of repayment and start a fresh 24-day cycle with the same 
rate. For tiền đứng, the borrower pays the interest every day until s/he repays the principal. For a 
VND1 million (USD43) loan, s/he must pay VND10,000 (USD0.43) in interest every day, which 
equals to one percent per day or 30 per month. That said, some giang hồ gangs charge up to three 
percent per day. While most lenders ask borrowers to repay tiền góp and tiền đứng loans daily 
(góp ngày), a few agree to weekly (góp tuần) and monthly (góp tháng) installments.  
Are these loans usurious? The matter is more complicated than it seems. According to the 
article 201 ‘Usury in Civil Transactions’ of the 2015 Criminal Code, usury is applicable when: 
 
“1. Any person who offers loans at an interest rate that is five times higher than the 
maximum interest rate specified in the Civil Code and earns an illegal profit of from 
VND30 million to under VND100 million [USD1,293-4,310] or previously incurred a civil 
penalty or has a previous conviction for the same offence which has not been expunged 
shall be liable to a fine of from VND50 million to VND200 million [USD2,155-8,621] or 
face a penalty of up to three years’ community sentence. 
 
2. If the illegal profit is VND100 million or over, the offender shall be liable to a fine of 
from VND200 million to VND1,000 million [USD8,621-43,103] or face a penalty of six-
36 months’ imprisonment. 
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3. The offender might also be liable to a fine of from VND30 million to VND100 million, 
be prohibited from holding certain positions or doing certain works for one to five years.”  
 
Article 468 of the 2015 Civil Code states that “the rate of interest for a loan agreed by the 
parties may not exceed 20 percent per year, unless otherwise prescribed by law.” A civil loan is 
thus usurious when its annual interest rate amounts to or exceeds 100 percent (unless the maximum 
interest rate is prescribed otherwise by law) and earns a profit over VND30 million (USD1,293). 
Loans from pimps, managers and moneylenders can easily exceed 100 percent per annum. Legally 
speaking, though, a lender would not be charged with usury if the loan generated less than VND30 
million in profit, unless s/he has been administratively fined, or charged with the said crime once 
but reoffends before his/her record of the crime is expunged. 
It should be noted that article 201 does not provide a general definition of what usury is. 
Instead, it only establishes the criteria to determine whether a person can be criminally charged 
with usury. Technically speaking, a loan can already be considered usurious when its rate is higher 
than the 20 percent rate prescribed in the Civil Code. However, a person (with no previous criminal 
record) can only be criminally charged – meaning that s/he might have to go to prison and have a 
criminal record – when the interest rate is five times higher than the 20 percent rate in the Civil 
Code and generate an illegal profit of more than VND30 million. This is because criminal law only 
and primarily deals with acts that can seriously and adversely affect another person(s) or society 
as a whole. Therefore, the act of one person would need to reach a certain threshold of seriousness 
for him/her to be criminally charged. For instance, a person can lend another one VND500,000 
(USD21.6) with an interest of 100 percent per year and generate a profit of the same amount. Based 
on this rate, the act of that person can be considered as usury from a civil law perspective. However, 
the VND500,000 profit made by that person’s lending act is not significant enough to bring that 
person to court and charge him with usury. S/he could be administratively sanctioned for such acts, 
but definitely not criminally charged. The notion of usury in article 201 of the Criminal Code is 
applicable in the context of criminal law only. It can be interpreted differently depending on 
certain areas of law like in civil law, banking law, and so forth. Therefore, to precisely determine 
whether an act is usurious has been, and still is, a complicated matter because of the different laws 
that govern it. 
Sex workers are unaware of the legal intricacies of usury and the legal risks their pimps, 
managers and moneylenders take by issuing tiền góp and tiền đứng loans. They borrow money 
from them to pay for living costs, health expenses and debt repayment. Two thirds (13) took loans 
to cover rent, bills, food, remittances, and children’s care and education, especially when they 
experienced cash flows. Almost half (8) also borrowed to deal with (contingent) medical expenses 
for themselves and their husbands, children and parents. In particular, one woman borrowed cash 
to redo her teeth, another to send her addict husband to a rehabilitation center, and a third to help 
her injured father following an accident. Quỳnh, a 39-year-old street sex worker and call girl, 
stressed that “my health is not good, so I need to spend money to treat my sickness. But I don’t 
have enough money. If I don’t treat my sickness, I won’t be able to work and take care of my kids. 
For example, I just went to the hospital a few days ago, which cost me over one million đồng 
[USD43]. It hurt terrible and I could not stand it. Next time, I will borrow money to pay for better 
treatment.” Lastly, half of the women (10) took loans to repay outstanding debts, in which case 
credit becomes a solution to itself. It should be said that all sex workers owed money to several 
lenders, a point to which I will return. Overall, sex workers have legitimate reasons to borrow. Let 
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us now see what loans they take from pimps, managers and moneylenders, and under what 
conditions. The examination of the collateralization of sexual labor and wages will shed light on 
enforcement mechanisms and the nexus of debt, labor and sex. 
 
3.1. Loans from pimps: the entanglement of procuring and moneylending  
Pimps were a vital source of credit for street sex workers. They provided other critical 
services, including client recruitment, protection against violent clients or those who refused to 
pay for a sexual service, transportation to hotels and motorbike rental, monitoring for police raids, 
bailout in case of detention, and provision of accommodation, food, clothing and drugs. Most 
pimps recruited clients and protected their protégés for half of their earnings. Others acted as 
brokers who connected sex workers and clients through phone calls and arranged meetings and 
transportation for cuts ranging from 20 to 40 percent of the transaction. A few pimps took full 
responsibility and delivered most of the services described above to their protégés. According to 
one respondent, they would also take them to health services when they became infected with STIs 
and, occasionally, develop a strong personal and sexual relationship with them. A service that all 
pimps provided was bailing out sex workers who were arrested and kept at the police station. They 
paid fines ranging from VND100,000 to VND300,000 (USD4.3 to 12.9) to free sex workers who 
were arrested for the first time, and up to VND500,000 (USD21.6) for repeat offenders. Linh, a 
street sex worker from Bến Tre, commented that “there are emergencies that left me no choices 
but to borrow from my pimp. For example, when I was arrested, he would come to the police 
station and pay a fine. He would later consider this money as a loan.”  
Pimps also offered credit. Those who had financial means proposed tiền góp and tiền đứng 
loans to their protégés, whereas those without cash introduced them to moneylenders by acting as 
introducers (người giới thiệu), alternatively as guarantors (người bảo lãnh) who agreed to cover 
the risk of default. Pimps lent up to VND5 or 10 million (USD216-431) at the standard rates 
described above. They did not require an ID or household registration certificate. To assess sex 
workers’ creditworthiness, they considered their credit history if relevant, income based on the 
number of clients served, expenses based on the number of dependent children and relatives, and 
potential addiction to gambling and drugs. Another important criterion was mutual trust between 
both parties built throughout years of partnership. In short, pimps could easily access critical 
information about their borrowers to assess risk. However, lending money to street sex workers 
was a risky business. According to Trân, a neighborhood moneylender and peer educator from 
AAT: “when pimps lend money to sex workers, they consider the risk of losing money. They know 
that lending money to sex workers is an all-or-nothing situation. They either get the money back 
or they don’t. That’s why they need to charge high interest.” Pimps’ primary concerns were sex 
workers’ income volatility, STI/HIV infection and police repression. 
How did pimps manage late payments and default? Against popular descriptions of evil 
and violent exploiters, most pimps exercised limited control over their protégés’ sexual labor. This 
was especially true when they only recruited clients and provided protection services. However, 
when they became lenders on top of brokers, they could broaden their scope of control to ensure a 
speedy repayment. In particular, they could introduce street sex workers to more clients, encourage 
them to accept deals that they would refuse otherwise, and take their cuts and debt installments on 
the spot. Huệ, a street sex worker aged 40 who had been repaying a VND3 million (USD129) tiền 
đứng loan to a group of pimps for years, mentioned that “since I work with them, they require 
nothing from me to borrow. They find clients for me. They know if I have money or not. So as 
soon as I earn money from clients, I have to pay them the interest. I borrowed this three million 
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đồng from them five or six years ago. If I don’t go to work one day, I have to pay double the next 
day. Since they are at my workplace, there is no chance I can pay them late or not pay them at all.” 
In essence, sexual labor serves as collateral for credit in arrangements between pimps and street 
sex workers. Procuring and moneylending thus become intertwined in brokerage arrangements. 
 
3.2. Loans from managers: the wage advance system 
Waitresses and hostesses working in coffee shops, restaurants, bars, and karaoke lounges 
borrowed money from their managers through wage advances, a popular credit system in sexual 
and non-sexual sectors of the labor market in Vietnam. Most managers did not make labor 
contracts (hợp đồng lao động) with their staffs, especially if workers were underage. However, 
they would check their worker’s ID and, at times, keep a photocopy. While some managers offered 
monthly wages ranging from VND2 to 6 million (USD86-259) to waitresses and hostesses, others 
provided no salaries and expected them to earn income from entertaining clients on the premise 
and having sex (đi chơi) with them out of the premises. While managers did not take part in these 
private trades, some made a profit by imposing fines (tiền phạt) to employees for skipping work 
(nghỉ làm). Uyên, the manager of a coffee shop in Gò Vấp district, detailed her business plan: 
 
“The coffee shop opens from 7 am to 11 pm. Unlike other cheap stalls on the street that 
only sell drinks, I have my employees talk to the clients. The full-time salary is VND5.4 
million đồng [USD232]. If the girls show friendliness and enthusiasm, they receive tips. 
Some of them live mostly on tips. The ones who want to earn more money and faster go 
out with clients. It is up to them if they want to go out or not. My only concern is that they 
work as I require in here. I don’t control what they do outside… I have ten employees 
working at night and six in the morning. Full-time workers work from early morning to 
late night with three hours resting. I pay them 5.4 million đồng. Part-time workers get 3.6 
million [USD155]. I provide them accommodation but not food. They can stay there or not. 
If they don’t stay, they still don’t get more money. I charge nothing for accommodation… 
The girls who go out during working time must pay a fine. For example, I have rules saying 
that when the girls are one hour late for work, they must pay a penalty. So, when they go 
out with clients, I consider it as if they are late for work. They must pay a fine. Outside 
working hours, they can do whatever they want.” 
 
According to sex workers operating in restaurants, bars, and karaoke lounges, the labor 
practices that Uyên described were common. However, credit practices could vary from one in 
entertainment venue to another. Some managers did not provide credit to their employees. Others 
provided tiền góp and tiền đứng loans at standard market rates. They required no additional 
paperwork or guaranties because they trusted their employees and knew their ability to earn tips 
and extra income from sleeping with clients. These modalities applied to the ‘wage advance’ (tạm 
ứng lương) system where managers advance the salary to their staff and deduct it from their 
paycheck, if the latter do not repay it before payday. In many cases, managers capped loans with 
paychecks, which were low for waitresses and hostesses. Uyên, the manager of the coffee shop, 
issued tiền góp loans of up to VND5 million (USD216) to her waitresses and, “if they haven’t paid 
me back, I will deduct it from their salary. Otherwise, I will pay them a full salary. For those who 
borrow 1 million đồng [USD43] in tiền góp, they will pay me 40,000 [USD1.72] per day for one 
month. They make about 5 million [USD216] a month, so if they can’t pay me, I will just deduct 
the loan from their paycheck. If they suddenly quit working, I may lose that money. But it is not 
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much, and this happens rarely.” A drawback of this credit system is that it is only available to 
employees. Lệ, 56, a street sex worker from HCMC who worked in beer shops, raised this point: 
 
“Since I have no salary, the manager won’t lend me money. It is very easy to work there 
and I can quit anytime. If you have a salary, you can borrow money by asking for an 
advance. Only employees who get paid can get loans, though. But I am not employed there. 
Employees are waitresses and waiters. They bring food to clients, clean the tables and wash 
dishes. In my case, I just sit there and talk to clients, pour them a drink and get to know 
them. If they like me, they give me 50,000 [USD2.2] or 100,000 [USD4.4] đồng in tips. 
There are two or three girls like me there. If I am lucky, I get tips. If they ask me to go out 
and I do, they pay me more money.” 
 
 In short, the wage advance is a risk-free, mutually beneficial credit system for managers 
and sex workers alike. However, managers do not apply it consistently. According to respondents, 
different schemes prevail. Some managers provide loans whose amounts exceed their employee’s 
wages because they take tips and payments for sex into account. Others lend money without 
interest to selected employees to help them. Xuyến, a waitress in a bar, mentioned that: “I borrow 
money from my manager, but she’s not like a moneylender. It’s more like a wage advance. When 
I need money, I just borrow 500,000 [USD21.5] or 1 million [USD43] đồng. If I cannot pay back, 
the manager deducts this amount from my salary. I don’t have to pay any interest. She only lends 
me money within my income limit.” Finally, managers can also work as moneylenders, in which 
case they lend money to employees and other borrowers as well. Uyên, the coffee shop owner, 
provided tiền góp loans to her staff and acquaintances. According to her, “since I am greedy of 
interest, I lend them some money, but not much because I often lose it with outside borrowers. As 
I said, my main work is the coffee business. I am not a giang hồ moneylender. Moneylending is 
just a second job for me, so I lend small amounts because there are big chances that I will lose my 
money.” In brief, wage advances are a heterogeneous credit system that limits risk for managers 
and employees, as loans are capped and paychecks serve as collateral. 
 
3.3. Loans from moneylenders: a last resort, risky option 
Sex workers turn to neighborhood and giang hồ moneylenders when they cannot borrow 
from pimps and managers for whatever reason. The women from the study appreciated tiền góp 
loans because they were slightly cheaper than tiền đứng and they could top them up after 15 or 20 
days of repayment. However, they struggled to repay the principal and interest every day. When I 
asked Hoa, a waitress working at Uyên’s coffee shop, why sex workers took mostly tiền đứng 
loans, she replied: “I think it is because they work as freelancers, so their income is unstable. There 
are days that they can make money and there are days they can’t. Since I work here, I have a fixed 
salary so I can choose tiền góp.” In other words, sex workers preferred to pay VND10,000 
(USD0.43) per million borrowed every day for a tiền đứng loan than VND50,000 (USD.2.16) for 
a tiền góp one. According to Linh, a street sex worker, “from a long-term perspective, borrowing 
tiền đứng means that we have to pay more. But there could be days we earn nothing, so we cannot 
pay on that day. From a short-term view, I choose tiền đứng because I pay less than with tiền góp.” 
This quote highlights the importance of short-term thinking, a point I shall return to shortly. The 
last point worth noting is that moneylenders allowed borrowers to turn tiền góp loans into tiền 
đứng ones. Nhung, a 45-years-old street sex worker, stated that “I started borrowing early last year. 
At first, I took a three million đồng [USD129] tiền góp loan. After a while, I asked my moneylender 
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to let me pay it as tiền đứng. She asked me to pay 45,000 [USD1.94] in interest per day, or 15,000 
[USD0.65] per million.” Therefore, moneylenders and borrowers weigh carefully the advantages 
and disadvantages of tiền góp and tiền đứng loans to negotiate transactions and payment plans. 
Neighborhood moneylenders offered flexible borrowing conditions but handpicked their 
clients. A prerequisite was to know and trust their borrowers, typically a neighbor, a friend, an 
acquaintance, or a business partner. Quyên, 41, a neighborhood moneylender, addressed the topic 
of trust: “I only lend small amounts of money, like 2-3 million đồng [USD86-129], to people I 
trust. I lend it to people who are very close to me or whose situation I am sympathetic to, mainly 
people having a small business. Even if I am known as an easy moneylender, I only lend money 
to people I know and trust.” To issue a loan, neighborhood moneylenders needed to know the 
borrower’s work and house address, but refrained from asking an ID or a household registration 
certificate as collateral. According to Lan, a moneylender who had worked in various 
entertainment outlets, “I only lend money to people I know and who have a selling business. I 
don’t give loans to strangers, or they may run away. I don’t ask for any paper, but I have to know 
their home and work addresses. I mostly lend money based on trust. Sex workers change their 
places often. But when the girls in my neighborhood leave, I know where they go next.” These 
requirements mean that neighborhood moneylenders only lent money to close people from their 
social networks, which limits the reach of their lending operation and profit. 
Most neighborhood moneylenders insisted that they lent money for ‘affectionate reasons’ 
(tình cảm), that is by providing cheap and flexible loans. Nở, a small moneylender, said that: “I 
am familiar with the girls and understand their situation, so I can’t grab their money like giang hồ 
gangs do. When they don’t have enough money, I go easy on them and let them slide for that 
month. If they aren’t able to pay me double next month, I let them pay one month and wait until 
they have enough money to pay for the missing month. But first, I go to their place to see how they 
live. If I see that they really cannot pay and are going through a hard time, I sympathize and don’t 
force them to pay.” As flexible as neighborhood moneylenders are, they must also recoup their 
money to sustain their business. When they run out of patience, they harass and insult (chửi) late 
repayers. I asked Trân, the moneylender and peer educator for AAT, how she pressures them: “I 
can say ‘fuck you or your mother, is it you or me now?’, or I could use more aggressive words like 
‘fuck your mother, fuck your father’. I only swear at the borrowers themselves. I never insult their 
mother, father and ancestors.” Neighborhood moneylenders like Trân rarely hit (đánh) stubborn 
(ngang) borrowers or made a fuss (tới nhà la lên) at their home and workplace to avoid attracting 
unnecessary police attention. The reason is because inflicting physical violence to close borrowers 
would damage their reputation in the neighborhood and thus their capacity to recruit new ones. In 
fact, the relationship between moneylenders like oand her clients is framed with the terms of 
reference chị-em or ‘old sister-young sister/brother.’ This referential system lends itself to the 
narrative of moneylending as a mark of tình cảm or good sentiments, a term frequently used in 
family interactions. The obligation to pay back is bound not only by the borrowing terms but also 
by the seniority and the family resemblance carried by the pair of pronouns chị-em. 
Giang hồ moneylenders operate rather differently. The ones my assistant and I meet lent 
money more easily than their neighborhood fellows and used more aggressive recovery methods. 
For small unsecured loans, they did not require material collateral, trust, or a prior connection with 
the borrower. In general, they asked for a photocopy of the ID or household certificate, and only 
occasionally kept the originals as collateral. They also enquired about borrowers’ home and work 
addresses. Some used third parties to assess creditworthiness. Quyền, a former convict and head 
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of a small giang hồ gang, explained how he proceeded before issuing a loan to a sex worker who 
was new to her network: 
 
“I only give loans to the girls who work in my area with managers I know of. I just need to 
know their house addresses. For example, if the girls want to work in my area, they can’t 
just come and work on their own because there are designated places and managers. These 
people are like pimps who have information about all the girls operating there. Since I 
know these managers, I don’t need to know who the girls are. For example, if a girl wants 
to borrow money, I just need to know that she works in an area that my friend manages. I 
will then ask her how much she needs and how she intends to repay the loan. After that, I 
will ask my friend the manager what he thinks of the girl who wants to borrow, let us say 
5 million đồng [USD216]. If my friend tells me ‘that girl doesn’t have many clients, she 
doesn’t make enough money,’ I will lend her 1-2 million [USD43-86]. Otherwise, I will 
give her 4-5 million [USD172-216]. The manager knows how many clients the girls have 
and how much they earn, so I rely on their knowledge to decide how much I lend.” 
 
The local pimps and managers that Quyền evokes can vouch for new borrowers without 
acting as introducers or guarantors. Other giang hồ gangs that do not control territories and have 
no connection to local procurers can ask new borrowers for a guarantor to limit the risk of default. 
As opposed to neighborhood moneylenders, giang hồ gangs use brutal recovery tactics; 
their motto being ‘if I lend money, I can always get it back.’ According to sex workers, their 
methods for dealing with late repayment included charging penalties and compound interest to 
borrowers, insulting and hitting them, making a fuss at their home, harassing their relatives, 
disclosing their debt to a spouse unaware of it, posting their pictures and personal information in 
their neighborhood, and splashing water paint and fermented shrimp sauce at their entrance door. 
These bullying campaigns had devastating effects on late repayers. Kiều, 36, a karaoke hostess 
who could not repay a loan to a giang hồ gang, described her frustration when one of its members 
addressed her using the pronoun con, normally used to refer to children, grandchildren and junior 
people. Conversely, he referred to himself as ông, a pronoun used to address grandfathers and 
senior and powerful men, or bố which means ‘father.’ According to Kiều, “these giang hồ people 
are much younger than me, but call themselves ông and call us con. They are from the North. They 
look massive and muscular and they always call themselves ông mày or bố mày. They even insult 
other borrowers much older than them using such pronouns, but no one dares to say anything about 
it because they’re very aggressive.” Xuyến, a bar waitress who took two tiền góp and tiền đứng 
loans worth VND5 million (USD216) each to a giang hồ gang, was afraid of them: “They would 
insult me and even threaten to throw shrimp sauce at my house. Usually, I’m only two days late at 
most for payment. Yet they still call on the phone to insult me. I don’t know if they do the same 
with my mother.” Quyền, the head of a giang hồ gang, stressed that instilling fear among borrowers 
was key to sustain his operation: 
 
“To be honest, at first, I need something to make them scare of me and make them realize 
if they don’t pay me or they flee, they won’t be able to work. I will come and make a fuss 
at their house and look for them everywhere. If they are still stubborn, they know that I 
won’t hesitate to hit them. We have to work hard and sacrifice our blood and tears to make 
that money, so we don’t give it easily away to people. I also need power. Not that I want 
to deal with borrowers using violence, but I want to use my power to make them scared of 
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me, so they pay me in due course. They must know that repaying is their responsibility. If 
they don’t pay me, it’s like if they steal from me. They must be afraid of me even if I do 
nothing to them. I just need them to understand they must pay me back.” 
 
To sum up, neighborhood and giang hồ moneylenders do not collateralize sexual labor and 
wages to secure debt as pimps and managers do. Instead, they use harassment to recover loans. 
However, these two types of moneylenders operate differently. For the former, lending is confined 
to highly localized social spheres because of their need for intimate knowledge of borrowers and 
the maintenance of good social reputation. They show flexibility and use verbal harassment in last 
resort. For their part, giang hồ moneylenders lend money to all sort of borrower which they recruit 
through social networks and aggressive street and online marketing. A common technique consists 
of gluing posters on city walls with enticing messages like ‘hello, there is money,’ ‘borrow money 
quickly,’ and ‘borrow money, pay on installments’ (see figure 2). Giang hồ gangs built a reputation 
for aggressiveness, instill fear among borrowers and rely on violence to recover loans.  
 
 
 
Figure 2: Advertisements for high-interest loans or ‘financial support’ (hỗ trợ tài chính) with no 
requirements for an ID are posted near FE Credit, the consumer finance branch of VPBank. 
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4. ‘Hard to repay’: Juggling with debts and 
living day-by-day 
 
 
• Policy and development advocates vilify usury and the ‘rapacious’ moneylender. However, 
moral judgments are socially and historically constructed and therefore disputable. 
  
• Sex workers get by and deal with drawbacks by juggling with debt, lenders and deadlines, 
and by borrowing from one lender to pay another one. 
 
• Sex workers live day-by-day in a form of present-ness organized around debt schedules, 
rhythms and deadlines. Repeated and chronic borrowing push many into a spiral of debt. 
 
• Sex workers do not defy their lenders but commit to labor and rest their hope in finding a 
generous patron to repay their debts. 
 
• Over-indebted sex workers can run away temporarily to signal their inability to pay to the 
lender, or permanently to start from scratch elsewhere. However, running away comes at a 
high social, professional and economic cost. 
 
------------------------- 
 
The second part of the central argument of this study is that sex workers struggle to repay 
their loans. How can this be? To answer that question, this section will first inspect the claim that 
tiền góp and tiền đứng loans are expensive. It will then describe how sex workers manage their 
financial lives by juggling with debts, living in the moment, using labor and hope to get by, and 
running away from their lenders. The analysis will highlight the constraints that sex workers face 
and their limited leverage, as well as their agency and strategies to cope with adversity. 
 
4.1. ‘Tiền góp and tiền đứng loans are expensive’: a disputable claim 
Is the standard rate for tiền góp (25 percent per month) and tiền đứng (30 percent at least) 
loans expensive? The answer is more complicated than the question. The sex workers praised 
pimps, managers and moneylenders for providing tiền góp and tiền đứng loans easily and quickly. 
However, they also found these products costly and called for an acceptable (chấp nhận được) rate 
of five to ten percent per month. Moneylenders used several arguments to justify their rates. The 
first was that moneylending is a risky business because defaulting borrowers run away. Như, a 38-
year-old moneylender who had worked as a waitress until her mid-20s, supported this claim: 
 
“Yes, it is true. Sex workers don’t have a stable income, so it is hard for them to pay. I lend 
money to three sex workers because I have known them for a long time. I don’t lend to 
women who work in outlets anymore. When I worked in an outlet, I sometimes lent money 
to friends because I was still working with them. Therefore, I could collect money easily. 
But since I am not a sex worker anymore, I have a hard time finding my borrowers to 
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collect money. Some sex workers are very stubborn. They may say ‘just hit me, it will be 
deducted into the debt.’ But I don’t hit them because the police can arrest me for that.”  
 
Moneylending is a risky gamble for neighborhood moneylenders who refrain from using 
aggressive enforcement methods. Several respondents recalled losses and difficulties in trying to 
recover their funds from defaulting borrowers. One described a descent into hell when she lost 
some VND200 million (USD8,621) provided by her lovers, which she lent to fellow sex workers 
who deceived her and ran away. 
A second argument lenders used to justify their rates is tradition. According to Nở, a 
neighborhood moneylender and former sex worker, the usual rate for tiền góp and tiền đứng “is 
like a general rule that has been around for a long time… an average rate that has always been like 
this. When you’re selling things, if you buy something at 10,000 đồng [USD0.43], you would 
usually sell it at 12,000 [USD0.52] instead of 15,000 [USD0.65] or 20,000 [USD0.86]. Otherwise, 
no one would buy it. That’s basically where the interest rate comes from and it has been like this 
for a long time.” Quyên, the moneylender who operated a family lending business with her sisters, 
further developed the argument of tradition from a market perspective: 
 
“One million đồng [USD43] becoming 1.2 million [USD52] is, and has always been, the 
rule… you can’t just lend money at 20 percent and then lower your rate suddenly to attract 
more customers. Since we work in the same business, we must share the profits. If one 
were to lower the interest to get more clients, s/he would steal everyone else’s business. 
Other moneylenders would not accept that and would ask their little brothers to slash your 
face or hit you in the middle of a street. I don’t know where the 20 percent rule comes from. 
Before I started this business, I heard about this unspoken rule. When I worked as a debt 
collector for other people, I came to know about this rate. I can’t reduce it. I don’t know 
how to express it for you to understand, but I cannot do it. If I feel sorry for the borrowers, 
I will give them money for free. But I can’t lower my rate.” 
 
In short, lowering the standard rate could disrupt the market and put moneylenders in 
conflict. That said, other managers and moneylenders did not view themselves in competition. In 
their opinion, they catered to different clients with specific needs in a big enough market to 
accommodate them all. 
A third argument put forward by lenders is that banks provide costly loans too, a claim that 
banks dispute by arguing that formal loans are cheaper and safer than informal ones. Which side 
is right? The truth lies probably in between. Many Vietnamese banks and financial companies are 
charging monthly rates of 4-5 percent on consumer loans (Thien 2019). Although this rate is lower 
than that applied by pimps, managers and moneylenders, it is irrelevant for borrowers who take 
short-term loans payable within a few days, weeks, or months. Thư, a sex worker who worked in 
two coffee shops, bought a smartphone on installments with FE Credit, the leading consumer 
lending service in Vietnam. She complained that a VND13 million (USD560) loan cost VND36 
million (USD1,152) in interest and fees over three years: “this amount is too much, so I don’t want 
to borrow from them anymore. Paying in three years is too long for me. For a loan I get from giang 
hồ, I can pay it off faster. And if I can pay it off fast, it won’t cost me as much money.” As Thư 
pointed out, the cost of a loan depended on its rate but also duration. This point about temporality 
is crucial for precarious workers who live day-by-day. Yet, policy and development advocates 
often omit it from their critics of moneylending. 
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Detractors of informal finance also argue that moneylenders who provide short-term, high-
interest loans are greedy and unscrupulous exploiters, parasites preying on poor and honest 
workers. Economists such as Fritz A. Bouman (1990, 160) challenge such dismissive judgments 
on usury. He takes the example of a peasant from a third-world country who borrows two dollars 
to buy four watermelons at USD0.5 each in the morning, a loan he must repay in the evening with 
a 20-cent interest. The daily interest rate is ten percent, or 3,650 annually. Policy and development 
advocates lambaste this moneylender for exploiting the helpless poor. However, let us imagine 
that the borrower cuts each melon into ten slices and sells each slice for ten cents to the poorest 
who cannot afford to buy an entire melon. This sale generates a two-dollar profit a day, ten times 
that from the moneylender. Policy and development advocates praise this seller for having an 
entrepreneurial spirit and caring for his family’s welfare. Therefore, making a profit out of money 
in a deregulated system poses a moral problem to advocates of financial regulation who aim at 
controlling transactions and profiting from them. In contrast, they see no problem in making 
similar or higher profits out of the sale of goods and money in regulated markets. This discussion 
shows that moral judgments on usury and socially and historically constructed and disputed. 
Overall, considering the arguments put forward by lenders and policy and development 
advocates is essential to caution against popular – yet often arbitrary and poorly informed – moral 
judgments on usurious interest and hideous-looking usurers. However, these arguments are 
irrelevant for sex workers who care little about moral debates in policy, development, and financial 
circles. Their primary worries are how to access credit, how to repay costly yet indispensable loans, 
and how to make ends meet despite adversity. 
 
4.2. ‘Borrowing here to pay there’: juggling with debts, lenders and priorities 
All sex workers from the sample were indebted. My assistant and I documented 61 loans 
obtained by 20 sex workers (see annex for details). Each had 3 loans, on average. Three women 
had one outstanding loan only, which resulted from repeated extensions of tiền góp and tiền đứng 
loans over the years. This was the case for Hồng, a 52-year-old separated street sex worker who 
owed a VND7 million (USD302) tiền đứng loan from a neighborhood moneylender. 
 
“I am borrowing from only one moneylender who is also my coworker. She knows where 
I work and comes to collect payments at my place. I took a seven million đồng [USD302] 
tiền đứng loan from her and I must pay 1 million [USD43] in interest per month. I don’t 
pay interest every day because there are days that I can’t make money. I ask her to let me 
repay every week when I have money. I am paying 250,000 [USD11] in interest per week. 
If I cannot pay weekly, I pay monthly. I must keep paying the interest until I have the 
principal to pay her. Sometimes I have a spare million to pay the principal. But then I need 
money and borrow from her again. I have borrowed from her for ten years. The interest is 
so high that I don’t dare to borrow from her anymore. At first, I only borrowed three million 
tiền góp [USD129]. I paid 30,000 [USD1.3] per day for each million, so for three million, 
I paid 90,000 [USD3.9] a day for 40 days. Back then, when I could not work and pay, I 
would top up my tiền góp loan after 20 days. At first, she let me pay weekly, but when I 
didn’t earn enough money to pay weekly, she let me pay monthly. I don’t remember exactly 
how long I have paid this loan. It has been about four or five years, I think. Later, I kept 
borrowing one or two million [USD43-86] more, so the debt grew to seven million 
[USD302]. I have paid one million [USD43] interest per month for the past five years. That 
means I have paid 12 million [USD517] a year for five years, while the principal of seven 
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million [USD302] remains unpaid. I know that I only pay little by little and that it is an 
enormous amount of money when it comes together. However, whenever I needed money, 
I had no choice but to borrow one or two extra million [USD43-86].”  
 
As this long quote suggests, the provision of a loan opens a line of credit, thus allowing 
borrowers to extend loans, negotiate repayment schedules and turn tiền góp loans into tiền đứng 
ones, or vice versa. The quote also highlights the share of income that Hồng allocated to servicing 
her debt, totaling 15.4 percent given that she earned VND6.5 million (USD280) per month and 
spent VND1 million (USD43) on interest payment. This share was a burden because she needed 
VND7 million (USD302) per month for food, accommodation, bills, children’s education and 
remittances, excluding contingencies. 
While three sex workers had one outstanding loan, most (17) had two or more loans from 
pimps, managers and moneylenders at the time of the interview. More specifically, four had two 
loans, seven had three loans, two had four loans, one had five loans, one had six loans, and two 
had seven loans (see annex). The situation of Nhung, 45, a street sex worker at night and peddler 
during the daytime, was the most extreme as she owed around VND30 million (USD1,293) to 
seven lenders, including: 
 
• a VND5 million (USD216) tiền góp loan to a giang hồ gang (four years), 
• a VND3 million (USD129) tiền góp loan to a giang hồ company (one year), 
• a VND6 million (USD86) tiền góp loan to a neighborhood moneylender (eight months), 
• a VND6 million (USD259) tiền đứng loan guaranteed by her sister-in-law to a local 
moneylender (four months), 
• a VND4 million (USD172) tiền đứng loan to a moneylender who was her friend (three 
years), 
• a VND3 million (USD129) tiền góp loan to two acquainted moneylenders (16 months), 
• a VND3 million (USD129) tiền góp loan to another friend (one year). 
 
Nhung earned VND12 million (USD517) per month from selling sexual services at night 
and cakes during the day, but spent VND8 million (USD345) on rental, food and children’s 
education, and around VND5.2 million (USD224) on interest payment. Like many of her peers, 
she was overwhelmed by the interest load and threats from impatient lenders, especially giang hồ 
gangs. 
Nhung could only manage her debts by ‘borrowing here to pay there’ (mượn đầu này đắp 
đầu kia) or by ‘borrowing a pig’s head to make porridge’ (mượn đầu heo nấu cháo). The economic 
term for this practice is ‘juggling,’ defined as the combination of financial tools, one in which an 
actor alternates between borrowing, repaying and lending, and between the positions of debtor and 
creditor (Guérin 2014b; Guérin, Morvant-Roux, and Villarreal 2014). Juggling is a ‘reactive’ 
strategy when it helps to overcome a drawback or a ‘proactive’ one when it facilitates wealth 
accumulation. On the ground, the sex workers constantly juggled with credits and debts, conditions 
and interests, lenders and borrowers. They approached juggling as a reactive strategy to repay 
outstanding loans, as opposed to lenders who used it as a proactive strategy to sustain and expand 
their operation. When I asked Nhung how she could repay so many loans concomitantly, she 
replied that “sometimes I don’t have enough money to pay for my debts, so I borrow money from 
one moneylender to pay another one. I have been in this situation for years... If I had no debts, I 
could live comfortably with the money I make. But I just kept extending my loans with one 
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moneylender and use that money to repay another moneylender. So, I’m always stuck with the 
same debts.” For highly indebted sex workers like Nhung, juggling is a standard mode of financial 
management and a driving force that shapes their priorities, relationships and life strategies. 
Simply put, it is a way of socializing, living and being in the world. 
Juggling requires prioritizing the repayment of the most pressing and risky debts, especially 
loans from giang hồ gangs. Kim, a 25-year-old waitress in a restaurant who owed money to her 
manager, a neighborhood moneylender and a giang hồ gang, mentioned that “I am not too scared 
of my manager. I am more afraid of the Hải Phòng people because they are the most aggressive. 
If I don’t pay them today, I will need money to pay them tomorrow. I really want to pay off my 
debt to the Hải Phòng gang. I am so scared of them. They are so cruel.” I asked Quách, a giang hồ 
moneylender, why people paid them first. His reply was eloquent: “it’s because we have our ways 
of dealing with problems. It’s quite difficult to talk about this, but if the borrower pays, everything 
will work out pretty smoothly. But when the borrower can’t pay or doesn’t want to pay, we’ll have 
our ways to deal with it. There are not that many ways, but I don’t think I can develop further. All 
I can say is that our way of handling can be a little violent.” To avoid being insulted, threatened 
and slapped by moneylenders, the sex workers would top tiền góp loans up, renew tiền đứng ones, 
and take up fresh ones. However, they could only borrow elsewhere by keeping secret their 
financial situation and genuine reasons for borrowing. Trân, the social worker from AAT and 
neighborhood moneylender, explained that “when people come and borrow money from you, they 
usually make up reasons that sound worth it and reasonable. They would never say that they owe 
money to another moneylender and that they want to borrow from you to pay back another 
moneylender. Most of the time, they give reasons such as that they need money to pay for 
electricity bills or their children’s education.” In brief, borrowers juggle with debts, timeframes 
and lenders, and compartmentalize sensitive information to stay afloat. This is an arduous task 
because of constant cash flows in the sex business and the intense circulation of rumors in tight-
knit sex work communities. 
 
4.3. ‘The debt gets bigger and bigger’: living day-by-day, combatting debt-entrapment 
Many sex workers frantically tread water to repay their loans. Juggling practices place them 
in an intense form of present-ness structured around debt schedules, rhythms and deadlines. Uyên 
complained about daily repayments, especially when “people come to my house to collect the 
money. For the debts I hide from my husband, I go to their place to pay. For the debt with the 
giang hồ company, I go to their place to repay too. So, I waste a lot of time dealing with these 
people every day.” As this quote highlights, giang hồ gangs collect payments before borrowers 
can spend their earnings on consumption. They visit sex workers at the end of the night or early 
morning when they wake up, as described by Kiều, the hostess working in a karaoke lounge for 
Japanese clients: “I can’t pay my debt to giang hồ late. I have to pay them at 1 pm every day when 
I wake up. They come to my house to collect the money. When I’m sick and they see I am unwell, 
I still have to wake up and give them the money. Otherwise, they will tell me things like ‘I gave 
you the money, so you have to pay. I don’t care if you are sick or anything.’” Neighborhood 
moneylenders replicated this collection practice, too. According to Quyên, the moneylender 
running a family lending business with her sisters, “back in the day, because most of the sex 
workers would start working when the street lights went on between 5 and 6 pm, I wouldn’t collect 
their money until 9 or 10 pm. I was young and used to hang out with friends and do things during 
the day. At 10 pm, I would start collecting money. Usually, I would collect money from the girls 
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closest to me first. If the girls were still working, I would sit around and wait. I would take their 
money as soon as I saw them.” 
Giang hồ moneylenders make sure that borrowers do not miss any payment and prioritize 
them at the expense of other lenders. This daily collection arrangement matches sex workers’ hand-
to-mouth lifestyle consisting of spending earnings on-the-spot and adjusting priorities as they go. 
In respondents’ words, they ‘lived through the day’ (sống ngày nào hay ngày đó) by ‘taking life 
as it comes’ (tới đâu hay tới đó), ‘thinking of what’s in front of us’ (chỉ nghĩ tới cái trước mắt) 
and resigning themselves to ‘what will be will be’ (tới đâu hay tới đó). Mai, a 29-years-old waitress 
in a restaurant, summarized this temporal framing nicely: “I’m just trying to live through the day 
now. I don’t think too far into the future because the more I think about it, the more stuck I feel. 
There’s no point in thinking about the future when it brings you nothing.” 
Living day-by-day also means refraining from calculating the interest burden. Some sex 
workers would record the installments dates for tiền góp loans to prevent being cheated by their 
lenders, especially if they topped the loans up frequently (see figures 3, 4). For tiền đứng loans, 
they only cared about how much they owed every day, not about the interests paid over weeks, 
months, or years. Hồng, a 52-year-old street sex worker from Đồng Nai, explained in tears that “I 
usually think that I only need to pay one million đồng [USD43] per month or 250,000 [USD11] 
per week. It is a small number. Sometimes, only when someone talks about it and I realize how 
much money I have paid in a year, I am startled. One million is a small amount of money to pay 
in a month, but calculating it in years, it is a huge number, I know that. But I cannot pay the 
principal, so I have to keep paying interest to the moneylender.” Not calculating the interests paid 
over the years helps to reduce anxiety. My assistant and I understood this mechanism by accident 
while conducting the first few interviews. After collecting data on sex workers’ past and present 
loans, I calculated the interests they paid over the years, often amounting to tens or hundreds of 
million đồng, and showed it to them on my phone’s calculator. While these figures left some 
women indifferent, they shocked others who broke into tears. We realized that, as Nga – a waitress 
in a coffee shop in debt with her manager and a moneylender – put it, “there is no point in 
calculating the interest. It doesn’t help at all as I don’t have enough money to pay the loans.” This 
economic behavior does not reflect sex workers’ frugality, carelessness or inability to rationally 
assess the gravity of their situation, as often suggested by advocates of abolitionism and financial 
education. Instead, it reflects rationality aimed at minimizing anxiety, frustration and impotence 
in a context of limited alternatives. 
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Figure 3: A note from for Kiều’s notebook recording the repayment and one top-up of a tiền góp 
loan. The numbers in the columns are dates (4/5 means 4 May 2018) and the crosses signal a 
daily payment. The top line reads as ‘5 million, installment is 200,000.’ The line in the middle 
means ‘standing debt 2.6 million, taking 5 million - 2,6 million = 2,4 million - 400,000 = 2 
million.’ Kiều took a VND5 million (USD216) tiền góp loan and repaid VND200,000 (USD8.6) 
per day for 18 days, after which she owed VND2,6 million (USD113). She then borrowed 
VND2.4 million (USD103) to keep the same principal (VND5 million) and daily installment 
(VND200,000). However, she only received VND2 million (USD86) because the lender took 
VND400,000 (USD17) as a fee for topping her loan up. The following section shows that Kiều 
topped it up again after 19 days of repayment. 
           ‘Easy to Borrow, Hard to Repay’: Credit and Debt in Ho Chi Minh City’s Sex Industry  
 
 35 
 
 
Figure 4: Another page from Kiều’s debt ledger showing four top-ups for a VND10 million 
(USD431) tiền góp loan over two months. Her entire notebook was a record of tiền góp top-ups. 
 
One of the sex workers’ chief concerns is debt-entrapment or over-indebtedness, a process 
of economic impoverishment and social, cultural and psychological atrophy. Once ‘one debt 
overlaps another debt’ (nợ chồng nợ), many borrowers feel entrapped in “a hole [from where] I try 
to climb up, but I always end up falling back into it,” to use a metaphor from Xuyến, a bar waitress 
in debt with three lenders. Over-indebted sex workers expressed many negative emotions. Như, a 
waitress from Tiền Giang province in debt with her manager and two moneylenders, explained 
that “you gave me a headache when you told me I am paying 200,000 đồng [USD8.62] every day. 
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I didn’t realize that. Since I am paying a small amount of money to each lender every day, I don’t 
calculate carefully the total amount I am paying. I am getting deeper and deeper in this hole, this 
situation.” Kiều, the hostess working in a high-end karaoke lounge for Japanese clients, blamed 
herself for falling into a debt spiral:  
 
“Back when I was not working in this business yet, I used to say that I would never fucking 
borrow money from moneylenders when I heard people talking about them. I said that I’d 
rather live poorly. But the thing is that once you’re in it, you can’t escape it. It’s challenging 
to put into words to explain it to you, but I’m unable to pay off my debt even though I only 
borrowed a small amount of money. There seems to be no way for me to pay it off. Even 
if I had some money to pay it off, there would always be unexpected expenses that would 
require more money, and that would get me stuck in debt again.” 
 
Tuyết, a street sex worker and call girl in debt with two neighborhood moneylenders, felt 
embarrassed about her situation: “I am ashamed of borrowing because I have to beg moneylenders 
to lend me. I must give them a good reason to issue me a loan. I am afraid that if I cannot pay off 
my debt, they will come to my house to annoy me. I also feel ashamed for being in debt. I feel 
pitiful for myself because other people are not in debt, but I am. Other people’s debt is their 
problem. But being in debt is embarrassing for me because I must keep borrowing.” In summary, 
juggling practices do not prevent some sex workers from falling into a frantic and anxiety-ridden 
present-oriented time filled with pressing deadlines and routines. Serial borrowing, in turn, 
establishes a kind of self-fulfilling cycle in which credit becomes a solution to itself. 
 
4.4. ‘I must work harder to pay off my debt’: committing to labor and hope  
Sex workers count on labor and hope to improve their financial situation. No matter how 
anxious and frustrated they are, they remain committed to repaying their loans, even in times of 
hardship. Labor is their most precious asset. Dao, a 30-year-old street sex worker in debt with her 
pimp and a giang hồ gang, stressed the importance of labor to manage debt: “I worry every day 
about catching a serious disease, but it is the way it is. I have to work harder to pay off my debt. I 
must work even when I am sick.” Yen, a waitress in debt with her manager and two moneylenders, 
was considering taking a second job to boost her income: “I know it will be tough, but if I am 
determined to pay off my debts, I must put a lot of effort into it. I will take two jobs until I can pay 
them off. I want to find a job that pays 100,000 đồng [USD4.3] per day. I will use that money to 
repay my debt. After a few months, when I have enough income, I will stop worrying about having 
to pay every day and going out with clients.” Many sex workers were able to repay their loans for 
years through hard labor and dedication. At some stage, Uyên, the street sex worker in debt with 
seven lenders, cleared her debts by combining sex work, manicure and petty trade: “for a while, I 
was out of debt. I paid off most of my debts between 2015 and 2017. I didn’t need to borrow again 
in 2017. When I started doing business in 2018, that’s when I became indebted again.” All-in-all, 
over-indebtedness is not necessarily a catastrophic event that ruins the borrowers’ lives forever. It 
can also be a temporary accident of life that be overcome through hard labor. 
Some sex workers also bet on unrealistic juggling practices to fix their financial situation. 
Uyên’s plan, for instance, was to take a significant loan to clear all her small loans: “I just hope 
that there is a moneylender that will lend me a sizeable amount of money. For example, I now 
have a 30 million đồng [USD1,293] debt. If a lender could lend me 35 million [USD1,509], I could 
pay off my debt and use the rest to start a business. I would then work slowly to pay off the big 
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debt. But it’s tough to find a moneylender like this.” This desire is more of a dream than a reality. 
A consequence of over-indebtedness is that borrowers exhaust their network of lenders, which 
leaves them no option but to approach giang hồ moneylenders for fresh credit. However, these 
gangs would only lend her a small sum at first. Also, even if Uyên were to find one that would 
lend her VND30 million, the interest load – 300,000 (USD13) per day or VND9 million (USD388) 
per month – would be unbearable. Nevertheless, hope and belief in a lucky (hên) event are free 
and essential to keep going. While some women sought for a generous lender, others hoped to hit 
the jackpot (trúng mánh). Hồng, a 52-year-old street sex worker, placed her hopes in lottery. With 
a smile on her face, she admitted that “I sometimes buy lottery tickets. I buy 10 or 20,000 đồng 
[USD0.43-0.86] per day. Maybe I will get lucky.” As I found in my doctoral research, gambling 
is, for many sex workers, not only a way of socializing and hanging out (đi chơi) with friends and 
relatives but also an investment that may pay one day, even if none of my informants ever hit the 
jackpot (Lainez 2019). 
A few of the women hoped to find a generous client who could pay their debts. However, 
such clients are scarce. Kiều, the hostess working in a high-end karaoke lounge, explained how 
Japanese men recruit hostesses to act as minor wives (vợ bé): 
 
“They give me 15 million đồng [USD647] per month, and I have to go out with them for 
four or five days when they ask me to. But I don’t think 15 million is worth it because I 
have to pay a fine to my manager for the days that I am on leave… But I want to think 
about my future, about how this Japanese guy I just met might like me and give me a certain 
amount of money for a fresh start… I’m just hoping and wishing that this man will help 
me, although dreams are just dreams. Actually, this man has a wife. He only sees me as his 
mistress for four nights a week. He told me he has a wife and children in Japan and that 
men are all the same – they like to have someone to go out when they go to a new place… 
He insisted that I should not ask for too much, that he was already giving me that much 
money and I shouldn’t be asking for more… I think I have more future in my current 
karaoke place because I can meet Japanese men like him. If I met one, I could meet others 
like him in the future. That’s just my dream, but I don’t know if it will come true.” 
 
Dreams come true for some women. Four sex workers from the sample described how 
relationships with men brought them a substantial capital, which they used to improve their lives 
and launch a moneylending venture. This was the case of Ánh, a 65-year-old sex worker who 
received VND200 million (USD8,621) from various Vietnamese men from overseas (Việt kiều) 
who hired her as a mistress on repeated occasions:  
 
“There were some men who liked me and empathized with my situation. They first gave 
me 20 million đồng (USD862) and returned to their country. The original story is like this. 
I accidentally met an old classmate when he came back from overseas. I was working at 
Tao Đàn Park back then. I was standing on the street and he drove by. When he saw me, 
he pulled up to talk to me. He took me out for a drink. I told him about my situation. He 
said that he would help. I did go out with him for a while. He gave me some money and 
returned to his country. He told his friends from overseas about me, so I would go out with 
them when they travel to HCMC. They paid me well. That’s how I could save up so much.”  
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For such fairy tales to come true, sex workers must seek opportunities and be ready to grab 
them. Nurturing social relationships and being alert are key strategies to increase their chances of 
finding a savior, even though such relationships are often temporary (Lainez 2019; 2015). 
 
4.5. ‘Running away’: a last recourse solution 
As a last resort, over-indebted sex workers ‘flee their debt’ (trốn nợ) or run away from their 
lenders. This practice signals their inability to repay their debt, but does not erase it nor does it 
make them less liable towards the lender. While most borrowers run away temporarily to recover 
financially and return hoping to reschedule their debt, a few leave forever to start anew elsewhere, 
away from lenders’ sight. Fleeing one’s debt is a widespread practice in Vietnam, as I observed 
during my doctoral research in the Mekong delta and HCMC, as well as in Vietnamese migrant 
communities across Cambodia and Singapore (Lainez 2015). A quarter (5) of the sex workers from 
the study ran away at least once. According to estimates from a neighborhood moneylender and 
two peer educators, three out of ten borrowers run away on average, which is a significant figure. 
Sex workers considered this option a last recourse because moving to another neighborhood, 
district, or city to live and work meant losing their vital networks of clients, peers and lenders. 
Kiều, the karaoke hostess in debt with her manager and a giang hồ gang, was considering running 
away: “I work in a lounge that serves Japanese men and there are other places that do that too. The 
problem is that if I go to places that serve Japanese men, my manager will know because all 
managers know each other. I could also work in an outlet for Vietnamese men. But I don’t like to 
work with locals because they drink a lot, pay less and misbehave. It’s hard to put up with them.” 
Keeping business as usual was is a major concern for sex workers who consider running away. 
Returning to the hometown (quê) is less appealing because of the lack of (well-paid) jobs 
for unskilled workers in the province. Hồng, a 52-year-old street sex worker who could not repay 
a VND7 million (USD302) tiền đứng loan to a neighborhood moneylender, was considering 
fleeing her debt: “I have thought about it, but I don’t dare to run away. There was a time I felt like 
I was in a deadlock because I could not make enough money. I thought of running away to my 
hometown in Đồng Nai. But up there, there are no jobs for me. Since the lender and I have been 
friends for ages, I was afraid she could find me and make a fuss at my house there. I was afraid 
that people would know about my job here.” Another problem with running away is family life 
disruption, especially if sex workers leave with their children. When my assistant and I discussed 
this issue with Tuyết, a call girl and a single mother with two children and no child support, in 
debt with two neighborhood moneylenders, she replied: “I don’t have any other places to go. My 
kids live here and go to school here. I can’t just leave.” In a nutshell, sex workers are reluctant to 
run away because they fear losing money, being unemployed in the country and disrupting family 
life, in particular children’s education and wellbeing. 
Despite the constraints, five sex workers ran away at some point. Hạnh, a street sex worker 
from Vĩnh Long fled when she could not repay daily installments to her pimp, a neighborhood 
moneylender and a giang hồ gang: “I don’t have many clients, it’s hard to find one these days. 
Right now, I am running away from giang hồ people. I haven’t paid for over ten days. If I make 
enough money to pay back, I will return to my usual workplace. I have to pay them soon or they 
will find me at my new workplace, eventually. I owe them six or seven million đồng [USD259-
302].” Runaways have to settle in an unknown place, which is often a costly and tedious process. 
They also have to hide from lenders who try to locate them by digging in their social networks and 
circulating their photos among pimps, managers and moneylenders. Hạnh was afraid of being 
found and hit by her lenders: “every time I go out, I cover my face carefully. I use a different 
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motorbike to go to places… I keep hiding, but they keep finding me.” Kiều, the karaoke hostess 
serving Japanese men, had similar concerns when she ran from her lenders in the coastal city of 
Vũng Tàu: “I was miserable. I ran away like a dog. I stayed in one place and didn’t dare to go out. 
I had no other way around it and I ran out of money to pay. This situation stressed me a lot. I felt 
like there was no way out.” Some lenders, especially giang hồ gangs, work hard to find runaways, 
recoup their money and uphold their reputation. When my assistant and I asked Quách, the 
moneylender who worked in an association, whether lenders like him have eyes everywhere, he 
replied eloquently that: 
 
“It’s sort of like that. We circle the possible locations to find the borrower. For example, 
let us say you run away from district one to district six. Wherever you work in district one, 
there will be a group of people you work with, either people you’re close to, or you hate. 
In this group, there will usually be information about you circulating because when one 
person knows about something, the others know too. The girls would usually sit together 
and talk about stuff. So, I only need to get into these talks to know where the borrower is.” 
 
In brief, it is challenging but not impossible for borrowers to elude angry lenders. Before 
running away, however, over-indebted sex workers would have to consider economic, social and 
emotional costs and the inconvenience of living in hiding. The cost of running away is so high that 
most sex workers flee temporarily and hope to return quickly to restructure their debt and ‘pay it 
little by little’ (trả nhỏ). Nở, a neighborhood moneylender and former sex worker, described how 
she negotiated flexible repayment plans with returnees: 
 
“There are special cases where borrowers cannot pay, so they run away for months or even 
years. Some come back when they have money because they are grateful for what I did for 
them. They ask me to repay not in a few months but half a year or a year. For example, 
they owe me ten million đồng [USD431] and ask me to pay in five months because they 
can’t pay in a shorter time. That means I must break their installments into smaller amounts, 
which takes longer to pay. Sometimes, I will let them pay little by little only the principal. 
But if I see they can pay more, I will make them pay little by little the principal and the 
interest totaling 15 million [USD647]. I decide as I wish as there are no rules.” 
 
A few sex workers run away definitively to start from scratch elsewhere. Kiều went through 
this experience after she fled from Vũng Tàu to HCMC: “at first, I thought of it as a temporary 
escape. I thought if I could make enough money to pay off my debts, I would return to Vũng Tàu, 
a city where it was easy to live. However, once I started working in HCMC, I felt like I could make 
much more money here and that life was even easier. I have been in HCMC since and have not 
worried about my lenders from Vũng Tàu because they know no one here.” Kiều’s successful 
evasion is more of an exception than the norm. It proved successful because her lenders could not 
locate her in HCMC. Moreover, there are abundant jobs in HCMC’s sex industry that pay more 
than any similar job in the province. Nevertheless, running away within HCMC and from HCMC 
to the province is more complicated and riskier. All-in-all, fleeing one’s debt and lenders is a 
gamble as a thick fog of uncertainty clouds the horizon of runaway borrowers. 
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5. Microcredit and consumer lending: 
Imperfect cures for complex problems 
 
 
• Microfinance and consumer lending are presented as antidotes against financial exclusion 
and exploitative finance. 
  
• Microcredit interventions implemented by government agencies aim to eradicate the sex 
industry rather than address sex worker’s financial hardship. 
 
• The government and financial community promote financial inclusion and consumer 
lending to solve financial exclusion and exploitative informal. It remains to be seen if 
finance inclusion can bring cohesion, equality and prosperity. 
  
------------------------- 
 
Policy, development and financial stakeholders promote two solutions to fix financial 
exclusion, credit scarcity and exploitative finance: microfinance and consumer lending. This 
section provides a critical and context-based examination of these antidotes and the conditions 
under which they could ease financial hardship for precarious (sex) workers. 
 
5.1. Microcredit interventions: eradicating financial adversity or sex work? 
The first solution that springs to mind to help financially excluded and debt-strapped sex 
workers is microcredit (tín dụng vi mô), a common form of microfinance (tài chính vi mô). 
Microfinance refers to the distribution of small loans, savings accounts and insurance to poor 
people from developing countries so they can launch small business ventures. Regarding 
microcredit programs, the applicant may be a group or an individual. In group lending, each 
member offers collateral to secure the loan and the lender considers the entire group in default 
when one of its members cannot pay. In individual lending, a sole client receives the loan and is 
responsible for its repayment. Once groups and individuals have successfully launched their 
business venture, they are required to save money and pay back their loan and interest. In theory, 
this process brings them income and security, skills and empowerment, and financial education 
and inclusion in environments where banks are reluctant to lend to poor people. Not long ago, 
neoclassical and neoliberal theorists fully concurred with the microfinance model’s celebration of 
self-help and the individual entrepreneur to establish a sustainable development path (Daley-Harris 
2004). Today, though, the consensus among scholars and practitioners is that microfinance spreads 
neoliberal policies, hampers poverty reduction, and makes life at the bottom of the pyramid worse, 
especially for women who are the primary recipient of microloans (Bateman 2010; Guérin 2014a). 
Microcredit initiatives targeting sex workers are rare. A few authors have examined the 
feasibility of micro-enterprise interventions for female sex workers in India (Sherman et al. 2010). 
Other works have investigated the incidence of micro-savings interventions on reductions in 
economic dependence upon sex work (Tsai et al. 2018), HIV risk reduction (Tsai et al. 2011) and 
violence against women (Tsai et al. 2016) in Mongolia. However, no research has yet examined 
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the feasibility and impact of microcredit interventions on indebted sex workers. In Vietnam, no 
women from the study ever took part in microcredit programs and only three had heard the term. 
On the contrary, the peer educators from AAT were familiar with interventions from the Women’s 
Union (WU) (Hội liên hiệp phụ nữ). This mass organization represents women and advances the 
Communist Party’s social, economic and political agendas on women issues and gender equality 
(Hoang 2019). Its members are often middle-class women who see themselves as the moral 
guardian of the nation, a role that may intimidate sex workers who live at the margins of society. 
Chiêu, an educator from AAT and member of the WU from HCMC, described how this 
organization restricted access to microcredit loans to sex workers. To access a microloan for 
investment purposes, an applicant must reside legally in HCMC, take part in social gatherings from 
WU, and go through a lengthy bureaucratic process with an uncertain outcome. Thuy summarized 
the application process as follows: 
 
“I’m working with the WU, and we can lend money to women in districts and wards. To 
be eligible for a loan, the applicant must have permanent residency or long-term temporary 
residency, and participate in a few activities from WU in her district… The job they do is 
not that important, but they have to at least take part in monthly events and activities for 
women so that the people in the ward or district know about them and their difficulties. 
Then, the WU would lend them money. If the district and ward ask you to buy calendars 
or donate to a piggy bank program and you tell them you’re too poor to do that, don’t think 
of ever getting any help. But if they ever lend you money, they will only give five million 
đồng [USD216] at most. To borrow money, you must also certify your situation to the Head 
of the residential group where you live, the Head of the women’s group in your area, the 
Head of that area and finally the Head of district and ward level for final acceptance. I’m 
working as Head of a residential group and the truth is that not all districts and wards are 
easy regarding microcredit. Only very nice districts and wards would do that.” 
 
The WU may also require the applicant to provide a sponsor to mitigate the risk of default. 
By requesting paperwork, a presence, a reputation and guaranties that many applicants cannot 
offer, especially internal migrants who have no temporary or permanent registration in HCMC, the 
WU excludes de facto many sex workers from subsidized lending. According to Đào, a peer 
educator from AAT, the WU refrains from issuing microloans to high-risk, transient groups such 
as sex workers “because they usually live in rental houses and change place constantly, so it makes 
it difficult for the WU to collect the money.” The three sex workers from the study who had heard 
of the WU microcredit program insisted that they were ineligible because they lacked paperwork, 
a sponsor, and a stable and legitimate job to use as security. Despite being mandated to support 
disadvantaged women, the WU does not prioritize sex workers and more broadly speaking internal 
migrants who cannot regularize their papers. 
The peer educators from AAT also pointed out three other microcredit programs for sex 
workers: one implemented by the Department for Social Evils Prevention (Chị cục phòng chống 
tệ nạn xã hội) alone, another developed by the Department for Social Evils Prevention and the 
Green Lotus Club (Sen Xanh Club), and one initiated by the Ministry of Labor, War Invalids and 
Social Affairs (Bộ Lao động, Thương binh và Xã hội) together with the AIDS Center (Trung tâm 
AIDS). Each of these programs provided sex workers with loans of VND2, 5, and 10 million 
(USD86, 216, 431) respectively to launch a microenterprise in selling lottery tickets, coffee, flan, 
sandwiches, duck eggs, etc. Sex workers had to submit a comprehensive business plan to receive 
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the loan, “for example, if a woman wanted to start a bread selling business, she had to know what 
tools she needed and how much she could make in a day,” according to Chiêu. The program from 
the Department for Social Evils Prevention and the Green Lotus Club imposed daily installments 
of VND10,000 (USD0.43). Yet the participants repaid inconsistently, which lead to the closure of 
the program. According to Đào, “even when we only asked 10,000 đồng per day and charged no 
interest, it was still very hard for us to collect money from the women. Apparently, they used the 
money they made from selling things to pay off other debts to giang hồ gangs and other 
moneylenders.” Trân, who referred needy sex workers to the program from the Department for 
Social Evils Prevention, added that “we lent small amounts of money and monitored their stall to 
check how their business was doing. However, we still got stolen in the end and the agency shut 
down the program.” This quote reminds us that sex workers prioritize repaying the most aggressive 
lenders first, in particular giang hồ gangs, at the expense of less threatening ones like a government 
agency that refrains from using violence for recover purposes.  
The limitations of these microcredit interventions stem from the fact that they aim to take 
women out of sex work rather than to alleviate financial stress. They reflect the abolitionist agenda 
promoted by the Vietnamese government aiming at eradicating the ‘social evil’ (tệ nạn xã hội) of 
prostitution (mại dâm). It is hard to see how these programs can succeed by providing alternative 
jobs to sex workers that paid less than sex work and without dealing with their debts. They could 
only succeed with non-indebted sex workers willing to leave the sex industry and lower their 
income, perhaps aging women or those facing circumstances of force majeure. Yet, no women 
from the sample fit these criteria. Some positive outcomes came out of microcredit initiatives, 
though. As Chiêu put it, “since the girls were still dealing with many hardships, they could not pay 
back the principal every month. However, the upside is that they could learn a new vocation and 
use that knowledge to work and stop sex work.” In essence, microcredit programs are not 
sustainable by design and can only benefit women who are willing and can afford to quit sex work. 
 
5.2. Consumer lending: can financial inclusion keep its promise of equality? 
The Vietnamese government and financial community propose to solve financial exclusion 
and exposure to (allegedly exploitative) informal finance by promoting inclusion into mainstream 
(likely responsible) finance services. Financial inclusion refers to the provision of appropriate and 
affordable financial services – transactions, payments, savings, credit and insurance – to meet the 
demands of financially excluded individuals and businesses. By expanding access to financial 
services to disadvantaged groups, increasing their economic opportunities and improving their 
lives, financial inclusion is meant to boost inclusive growth, economic development and financial 
deepening. Financial exclusion is high in Vietnam. In 2017, 70 percent of the population had no 
bank account, 57.4 percent saved money but only 14.5 percent did it at a financial institution, and 
49 percent borrowed funds, of which 29.5 percent did so from family and friends and 21.7 percent 
from financial institutions or using credit cards (World Bank 2018, 160). This data echoes this 
study’s findings, namely that sex workers have no bank account and take unsecured loans for 
consumption in the thriving informal credit market. Promoting financial inclusion to decrease 
vulnerability and increase equality seems loadable and reasonable. 
However, research shows that financial inclusion is not the panacea, as it may reinforce 
inequalities by creating differentiated and unequal financial landscapes where credit price, 
conditions, and targeting include borrowers but only partially (Leyshon and Thrift 1995). The 
inclusion/exclusion binary becomes irrelevant as financial inclusion progresses. In the UK, for 
example, financially stable households with high, secure incomes are ‘super included’ in 
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mainstream financial services that provide prime loans. In contrast, lower-income households that 
are ‘bypassed’ by mainstream institutions turn to doorstep, payday, and pawnshop lenders for 
subprime loans (Burton et al. 2004). Some of these developments are visible in Vietnam, where 
consumer lending is booming with a 65 percent growth in 2017. Major players include FE Credit 
(a consumer finance branch of VPBank, see figure 2), Home Credit, HD Saison, and Prudential 
Finance. Besides, financial technology start-ups are betting on the strong internet penetration in 
Vietnam to reach unbanked consumers and overcome distrust in the banking system. Digital 
platforms are being developed in huge numbers to improve credit access. While companies like 
Vaymuon, Tima, and HuyDong are proposing peer-to-peer lending applications, MoMo, 
ViettelPay, and ZaloPay are developing mobile payment systems and e-wallet applications, to 
name but a few (Fintechnews Vietnam 2019). Meanwhile, microcredit players like Microfinance 
Organization Limited, the Fund for Women and EVN Finance are boosting consumer lending. To 
help consumers make effective financial planning, debt management, and interest calculation, the 
State Bank of Vietnam is promoting financial education in line with initiatives from the Vietnam 
Bank for Social Policies, HSBC, Home Credit, and Visa International. Consumer credit is, thus, 
in full swing. However, it is only targeting the middle class willing to spend on shopping, tourism, 
high-tech products, health care insurance and home improvement. For the time being, the poor in 
urban, rural and ethnic settings, including precarious (sex) workers, are left behind, which further 
reinforces the existent class, gender and ethnic inequalities. This point was raised by Quách, the 
giang hồ moneylender, who was skeptical about financial inclusion. In his opinion, “when banks 
try to expand their business like that, how and when do you think sex workers or people like them 
will be able to borrow money from such institutions? We are not really afraid of anything because 
there will still be people borrowing from us.” All-together, it remains to be seen whether financial 
inclusion can fulfill its promises of cohesion, equality and prosperity and reach disadvantaged 
workers and internal migrants in Vietnam.  
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6. Conclusion  
 
 
This report on credit and debt in HCMC’s sex industry shows that informal credit is widely 
available to financially excluded sex workers, but that this availability comes with a high cost and 
tight constraints. This tension is nicely encapsulated in the quote from Nguyệt featured in the 
introduction: ‘it is easy to borrow, but it is hard to repay.’ A key finding from this study is that sex 
workers are (heavily) indebted. It results from a bias in the recruiting process. However, it also 
reflects a general trend toward fast-rising household debt in Vietnam. Between 2000 and 2016, per 
capita debt surged tenfold from USD126 to USD1,296 and household debt 50-fold from USD1.76 
to USD91 billion, marking an average annual growth rate of 28.6 percent, while the GDP increased 
six-fold from USD31.7 to 205 billion. Moreover, the ratio of household debt to total credit has 
remained above 20 percent from 2010 onwards and reached nearly 40 percent in 2016. The ratio 
of household debt to GDP has also soared quickly in the past five years to exceed 40 percent at the 
end of 2016 (Nguyen et al. 2018). To date, it is unclear if consumer spending growth results from 
the expansion of consumer credit or from an increase in GDP per capita (which reached USD1,964 
in 2018 and is expected to grow six percent annually in the next decade), or from both factors at 
the same time. Several questions beg further consideration. Are people spending more because 
they earn more or because they borrow more? Do the rising levels of household debt result from 
the emergence of a consumerist culture that leads consumers to spend beyond their means or from 
low wages, income inequality and the inadequacy of safety nets? In this case, could credit become 
a remedy to precarity as well as a trap (Nguyen et al. 2018)? This study shows that sex workers 
borrow from the few informal sources available to them to cover daily expenses, contingencies 
and debt repayment in a context of sex work-related risks and lack of savings and social protection. 
A second finding is that debt can be harmful and coercive, a tool used by lenders to control 
and extract capital from sex workers. Research in economic anthropology and sociology shows 
that debt is often perceived as destructive and weakening, whereas credit is regarded as productive 
and empowering (Peebles 2010; Gregory 2012). Debt has no universal meanings but a variety of 
meanings and formulations that depend on the arrangements between the creditor and the debtor 
and the social and historical context. While some debts may produce solidarity and social cohesion, 
others lead to exploitation, hierarchy and domination (Guérin 2014b; 2018; Lainez 2020). This 
report leans towards the negative assessment of debt. Is this extractive and coercive debt specific 
to the sex trade? Pimps broker services and provide credit to street sex workers. By encouraging 
them to work harder to repay their debt, they exert control over their sexual labor, a right that can 
lead to coercion. It is unclear if this recovery method is specific to the sex trade. Future research 
could examine if similar modes of labor collateralization prevail in other brokerage arrangements. 
Managers collateralize the future labor of waitresses and hostesses by advancing wages. This wage 
advance system is ubiquitous in many labor sectors in Vietnam and elsewhere (see Hunt and 
Hayward 2018 for the United States). Lastly, moneylenders provide loans to workers, petty traders 
and business people, which they secure through social mechanisms and verbal and physical 
harassment. They apply these methods to all borrowers. Therefore, sex workers are caught in a 
moneylending system that is not specific to the sex trade, except perhaps for the brokerage-credit 
framework that requires further inquiry. Most of the findings from this study have thus broader 
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implications as they may apply to precarious and financially excluded workers who borrow from 
the informal credit market to make ends meet. 
Another key finding is that indebtedness puts many sex workers on the verge of collapse. 
It is tempting to blame pimps, managers and moneylenders for being evil usurers (người cho vay 
nặng lãi) that make the headlines and exploit disadvantaged borrowers with ‘cut-throat interest 
rates’ (lãi cắt cổ). Sticking to this moral reasoning may be limiting, though. First, moral judgments 
on credit and debt are situated in specific social, political, and historical contexts. They are also 
continuously formed, negotiated, disputed and manipulated by parties with divergent interests at 
stake including governments, development and financial stakeholders, as well as civil society and 
borrowers. Bouman’s (1990) evocative vignette of how development advocates judge arbitrarily 
moneylenders and entrepreneurs is a clear illustration of moral relativism, and that no moral 
standpoint should prevail without critical reasoning. Second, pimps, managers and moneylenders 
are just the tip of the iceberg in the vast informal finance sector in Vietnam. This sector has played– 
and continues to do so – a vital role for development since the Renovation reforms. In particular, 
small, short-term and unsecured loans have been critical in funding the needs of modest households 
and small entrepreneurial ventures (Pham and Lensink 2007; Ruddle 2011; Goto 2013; Lainez 
2020). The rapid substitution of this sector by consumer lending, as predicted by the government, 
is unlikely to happen soon. Furthermore, informal credit cannot be conflated with moneylending, 
as it is but one of its many sectors. While some giang hồ gangs impose high-rates and harsh tactics, 
many neighborhood moneylenders and other types of lenders provide valuable and needed services 
to a clientele in their proximity under more flexible and lenient conditions. Third, focusing on evil 
moneylenders at the expense of structural issues like growing inequality and administrative, social 
and financial exclusion prevents us from gaining a broad understanding of household debt and 
conceiving effective levers for action. 
From a practical standpoint, envisioning practical solutions to help indebted sex workers is 
a daunting challenge for NGOs given the structural underpinnings of household debt. AAT runs a 
small microcredit program for women who wish to quit sex work, similar to those implemented 
by government agencies. This program advances the cost of vocational training and equipment to 
launch a micro-enterprise. Once grantees have completed the training and earned an income, they 
must repay the loan on installments with no interest. In reality, AAT returns this money as saving, 
but it does not disclose this information in order not to alter the repayment. Applicants must 
provide a business plan, a guarantor and a letter of commitment. Three adults and one minor have 
so far participated in this program. Two studied manicure, one learned eyelash making and another 
trained in makeup. All completed the course, which lasted three months and cost VND8 million 
(USD345). However, they only repaid VND1 million (USD43). AAT made no action to enforce 
repayment. In 2019, two of the women were working in non-sexual labor sectors different from 
those they committed to initially. This program has limitations that make it unattractive to sex 
workers. The problem is that they must stop working for months to study full time, which few can 
afford, to take jobs that pay less than sex work. Besides, AAT runs another program that provides 
medical insurance to needy sex workers and scholarships for their children’s education. On one 
occasion, AAT repaid the debt of a participant to an aggressive giang hồ gang. This comprehensive 
program is perhaps the most promising solution to support sex workers facing adversity. It could 
be combined with the microcredit program if the women wish to quit sex work. However, the 
drawbacks of these interventions are their high cost and the lack of interest from donors whose 
focus is on limiting health (STI/HIV infection) and labor (trafficking) risks rather than financial 
risk. A more policy-oriented action would be to push for a reform of the household registration 
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system and the facilitation of temporary registration to internal migrants. Local civil society groups 
and international NGOs and organizations like the World Bank (World Bank, VASS 2016) have 
advanced this agenda for years, but with limited success so far. This reform could facilitate sex 
workers’ access to public schooling, health and housing, and subsidies for poor households, hence 
relieving financial pressure from migrant families and single mothers with no child support. 
Meanwhile, (sex) workers in precarious administrative, social and financial situations will most 
likely continue to borrow money from any source available to them, either formal, informal, or a 
combination of the two, to fund consumption and make ends meet. 
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